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Back to the Future: Does Apprendi Bar a 
Legislature's Power to Shift the Burden of Proof Away 
from the Prosecution by Labeling an Element of a 
Traditional Crime as an Affirmative Defense? 
The Supreme Court has consistently interpreted the Due Process 
Clause' of the United States Constitution to require the prosecution in a 
criminal trial to prove "every fact necessary to constitute the crime with 
which [the defendant is being] charged."' The Court's interpretation is 
Associate Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law. I gratefully acknowledge the 
thoughtful guidance of Professor Bennett L. Gershman. I would also like to thank Roy Galewski, 
Victoria Oswald, Mavis Ronayne, Audrey Friedichsen, Delight Wilson, and Dave Williams for invalu- 
able research assistance. 
I 
"No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, 5 I .  
' In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,364 (1970); see, e.g., Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466,477 
(2000) (holding that any fact which may increase the penalty of a crime beyond the statutory maxi- 
mum, other than a prior conviction, must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt); Almendarez-Torres v. 
United States, 523 U.S. 224,239 (1998) (holding that the existence of a prior conviction is appropriate 
to enhance the penalty of a conviction and need not be included in the criminal indictment); Martin v. 
Ohio, 480 U.S. 228,23 1-32 (1987) (holding that it was not a violation of the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to   lace the burden of ~rovina self-defense on the defendant charged with 
committing aggravated murder); McMillan v. ~ h n s ~ l v k i a ,  477 U.S. 79, 85 (1986) (holding that a 
sentencing enhancement which constitutes an element of the crime does not violate due process if it is 
considered only after the defendant has been convicted of the underlying offense); patterson v. New 
York. 432 U.S. 197,204 (1977) (holding that an affirmative defense that does not negate any facts of 
the crime which the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is not violative of due process, but 
constitutes a separate issue upon which the defendant carries the burden of persuasion); Mullaney v. 
Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 685 (1975) (holding that the state cannot shift to the defendant the burden of 
proving that he acted in the heat of passion to reduce his charge from homicide to manslaughter be- 
cause it was incumbent upon the state to disprove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted in 
the heat of passion during the commission of the crime). In Winship, the Court stated: "Lest there 
remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of the reasonable-doubt standard, we explicitly hold 
that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a rea- 
sonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged." Winship, 397 
U.S. at 364; see also Thomas V. Mulvrine, Reasonable Doubt: How in the World Is It Dejned?, 12 
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fundamental to the jurisprudential principle that a defendant may not be 
convicted without proof beyond a reasonable doubt of each essential ele- 
ment of the crime.  he outer limits of this principle, however, allow legis- 
latures and courts to shift this heavy burden of proof away from the prose- 
cution by including in its criminal statutory scheme that which may not 
necessarily define the corpus of the crime, but which potentially threatens a 
defendant's liberty.3 
Consider the following scenarios: 
(1) A defendant enters a building and declares: "This is a robbery and I 
have a gun." Congress defines bank robbery as attempting to take property 
from a Federal bank by force or ~iolence.~ The prosecution will succeed in 
its case if it proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intended 
to enter a bank and that she threatened violence. If the prosecution is suc- 
cessful, the defendant may be sentenced to up to twentyiears in jail.' Un- 
der the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, the sentence is increased if the de- 
fendant threatens death during the perpetration of the ~ r i r n e . ~  Therefore, 
the prosecution can increase the defendant's punishment if it can prove, by 
a lesser burden of proof (preponderance of the evidence), that the defen- 
AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 195 (1997) (examining the historical development of the reasonable doubt 
standard, problems with defining the standard, other potential definitions based on international mod- 
els, and possible solutions to provide clarity to jurors). 
See, e.g., Martin, 480 U.S. at 233 (holding that defendant's burden of proving by a preponder- 
ance of the evidence that she was acting in selfdefense when she committed murder does not violate 
the Due Process Clause); Patterson, 432 U.S. at 205-06 (holding that defendant's due process rights 
were not violated by requiring him to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the affirmative defense 
of acting under the influence of extreme emotional distress); United States v. Dodd, 225 F.3d 340,342 
(3d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 959 (2001) (placing the burden on the defendant of proving by a 
preponderance of the evidence the elements of a justification defense when raised in response to a 
felon-in-possession charge); United States v. Deleveaux, 205 F.3d 1292, 1298-99 (1 lth Cir.), cert. 
denied, 530 U.S. 1264 (2000) (holding that a justification defense is an affirmative defense that may be 
raised on a felon-in-possession charge, but the burden is shifted to the defendant to prove justification 
by a preponderance of the evidence because the defense does not negate an element of the crime); 
United States v. Gomez, 92 F.3d 770, 775 (9th Cir. 1996) (maintaining that the defendant must estab- 
lish all four elements of a justification defense by a preponderance of the evidence). But see United 
States v. Talbott, 78 F.3d 11 83,1186 (7th Cir. 19%) (allowing the defendant to merely raise a justifica- 
tion defense and then shifting the burden to the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant was not justified in possessing a weapon). For a discussion on the burden of proof distinc- 
tion between elements and defense, see Donald A. Dripps, The Constitutional Status of the Reasonable 
Doubt Rule, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1665 (1987): 
In light of the connection between the reasonable doubt rule and the due process le- 
gality principle, the distinction between elements and affirmative defenses appears 
untenable; the risk of unjust conviction is no less urgent in the context of affirmative 
defenses. Neither deference to historical practice nor concern for legislative flexibil- 
ity can justify the judicial distinction. 
Dripps, supra, at 1667. 
18 U.S.C. 5 2113 (2000). 
Id. 
6 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 5 2B3.1@)(2) (2001). 
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dant's words "I have a gun" threatened violence of deaths7 
(2) A defendant intentionally stabs his wife after finding her with an- 
other man. The New York State Legislature defines murder as the inten- 
tional killing of another, punishable by life in p r i s ~ n . ~  Under the statute, 
the defendant is entitled to a lesser punishment if he acted under extreme 
emotional disturbance? If the prosecution can prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant intentionally killed his wife, then the defendant 
may be punished for life. However, if the defendant can show by a pre- 
ponderance of the evidence that he was so distraught at the sight of his wife 
with another man that he acted with extreme emotional disturbance, then 
his punishment may be significantly reduced." 
In each instance, the duration of the defendant's punishment is 
determined by proof of particular elements as outlined by the legislature. 
Because of legislative definition, however, the prosecution need not prove 
each of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt." Specifically, the 
legislature can define which elements are "fact[s] necessary to constitute 
the crime," requiring the prosecution to present proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt for conviction of a crime and which elements merely define the pun- 
ishment boundaries of the crime, thereby allowing proof by a lesser stan- 
dard.'* With this power comes the legislature's ability to circumvent the 
procedural safeguards of the Due Process Clause. By designating an ele- 
ment as a "factor that bear[s] solely on the extent of punishment," the legis- 
lature exempts from strict scrutiny elements that directly affect the duration 
7 See United States v. Carbaugh, 141 F.3d 791,792 (7th Cir. 1998). Under the Sentencing Guide- 
lines, if a defendant makes an express threat of death, punishment is increased by two levels. See U.S. 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 8 2B3.l(b)(Z) (2001). 
N.Y. PENAL LAW 5 125.25 (West 1998). 
Id. 
10 Id. 
I I See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. $5 2C:43-7(a), 2C:44-3(e) (West 1995) (authorizing an extended 
term of imprisonment for hate crime); see also United States v. Dodd, 225 F.3d 340,342 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(concluding defendant charged with the unlawful possession of a firearm must prove all elements of an 
affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence); United States v. Deleveaux, 205 F.3d 1292, 
1298-99 (1 lth Cir. 2000) (holding defendant's assertion of an affirmative defense may require the 
defendant to prove the defense by a preponderance of the evidence); McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 
U.S. 79,85-86 (1986) (applying 42 PA. CONS. STAT. 5 9712 (1998), defendants who are convicted of 
felonies are subject to mandatory minimum sentences when it is found, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that the defendant visibly possessed a tirearm during the felony offense); Davis v. Alls- 
brooks, 778 F.2d 168, 172 (4th Cir. 1985) (holding that a state may shift the burden of disproving an 
element of a crime to the defendant so long as the presumed fact is rationally connected to a proven 
fact); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 205-06 (1977) (holding that N.Y. PENAL LAW 8 125.25, 
which requires the defendant being charged with second-degree murder to prove by a preponderance of 
the evidence the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance, does not violate the Due hoc- 
ess Clause). 
I2 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). These elements usually take the form of sentence 
enhancements, which aggravate the length of punishment for a particular crime or affirmative defense, 
which eliminate or decrease the punishment for a crime. 
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of a defendant's loss of liberty. " 
The legislature's ability to define "elements that bear solely on the ex- 
tent of punishment" prompted judicial concern for legislative abuse in evis- 
cerating the Due Process Clause. In the mid-1970s, Mullaney v. Wilbur14 
held that the Maine State Legislature could not mask an element of a 
substantive crime by calling that element a defense." However, one year 
later, the Court, in ~atterson v. New york,I6 reversed its decision, holding 
that the extreme emotional distress provision included in New York's 
murder statute was not an essential element of the crime." It was, 
therefore, permissible within constitutional guidelines for the New York 
Legislature to include in its murder statute an element that did not require 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt within the definition of the substantive 
offense.'' The Patterson rule seemed to control decisions in this area of 
the law for the next twenty years. 
Most recently, however, the Court has decided a series of cases 
suggesting that, at least where sentence enhancements are concerned, it is 
interested in returning to the strict construction of M~llaney. '~ In Jones v. 
l3 Apprendi v. New Jersey. 530 U.S. 466,485 (2000) (quoting Winship, 421 U.S. at 698). 
l4  421 U.S. 684 (1975). 
l5 Id .  at 702. The Court held: 
[Plroving that the defendant did not act in the heat of passion on sudden provocation 
is similar to proving any other element of intent; it may be established by adducing 
evidence of the factual circumstances surrounding the commission of the homicide. 
And although intent is typically considered a fact peculiarly within the knowledge of 
the defendant, this does not, as the Court has long recognized, justify shifting the 
burden to him. 
Id. See generally Stephen Michael Everhart, Putting a Burden of Production on the Defendant Before 
Admitting Evidence that Someone Else Committed the Crime Charged: Is I t  Constitutional?, 76 NEB. L. 
REV. 272 (1997) (positing that it is unconstitutional to place the burden of proof on the defendant for 
the introduction of evidence relating to a third party's guilt). 
l6 432 U.S. 197 (1977). 
, . 
I' The Court reasoned: 
This affirmative defense, which the Court of Appeals described as permitting "the 
defendant to show that his actions were caused by a mental infirmity not arising to 
the level of insanity, and that he is less culpable for having committed them," does 
not serve to negative any facts of the crime which the State is to prove in order to 
convict of murder. It constitutes a separate issue on which the defendant is required 
to carry the burden of persuasion. 
Id. at 206-07 (citations omitted). 
18 See, e.g., Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 236 (1987) (upholding an Ohio criminal statute that 
places upon the defendant the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence an affirmative 
defense, and stating that "Patterson [was] authority for our decision"); McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 
U.S. 79, 83 (1986) (holding that Pennsylvania's Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Act "creates no 
presumption as to any essential fact and places no burden on defendant; [nor does] it . . . relieve the 
prosecution of its burden of proving guilt") (internal citations omitted). 
l9 See, eg.,  Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466,477 (2000) (holding that any fact which may 
increase the penalty of a crime beyond the statutory maximum, other than a prior conviction, must be 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt); Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373,377-79 (1999) (holding that 
aggravating factors in a death penalty sentencing decision must have been proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt in order to be applied); Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 239 (1998) (holding 
that the existence of a prior conviction is appropriate to enhance the penalty of a conviction and need 
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United States 20 and Apprendi v. New Jersey:' the Court, relying in part on 
Mullaney, held that the legislature might not relieve the prosecution of its 
burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt any fact that enhances the de- 
fendant's senten~e.~' By including some items that increase penalties and 
must be proven by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt, the Court 
resurrected the fundamental principle of Mullaney. The Court concluded 
that a legislature may not circumvent the protections of the Due Process 
Clause "merely by redefin[ing] the elements that constitute different 
crimes, [and] characterizing them as factors that bear solely on the extent 
of punish~nent."~~ 
Scholars maintain that these recent decisions could portend an end to 
the defendant's burden to prove affirmative defenses.24 This Article con- 
siders whether it would be sound to extend the Apprendi rule to affirmative 
not be included in the criminal indictment); McMillan, 477 U.S. at 85 (holding that a sentencing en- 
hancement which constitutes. an element of the crime does not violate due process if it is considered 
only after the defendant has been convicted of the underlying offense). 
While noting that we had just last year expressed serious doubt concerning the con- 
stitutionality of allowing penalty-enhancing findings to be determined by a judge by 
a preponderance of the evidence Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999), the 
court concluded that those doubts were not essential to our holding. Turning then, as 
the appeals court had, to McMillan, as well as to Almendarez-Torres v. United 
States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), the court undertook a rnultifactor inquiry and then held 
that the hate crime provision was valid. In the majority's view, the statute did not al- 
low impermissible burden shifting, and did not "create a separate offense calling for 
a separate penalty." [State v. Apprendi,] 159 N.J., at 24,731 A.2d, at 494 [(1999)]. 
Rather, "the Legislature simply took one factor that has always been considered by 
sentencing courts to bear on punishment and dictated the weight to be given that fac- 
tor." 
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 472-73. 
20 527 U.S. 373 (1999). 
2 1 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
22 See Jones, 527 U.S. at 240-52; Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490. "Other than the fact of a prior con- 
viction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must 
be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. The Court in Apprendi also ac- 
knowledged Judge Stevens' concumng opinion in Jones, in which he stated "[ill is unconstitutional for 
a legislature to remove from the jury the assessment of facts that increase the prescribed range of penal- 
ties to which a criminal defendant is exposed. It is equally clear that such facts must be established by 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. (quoting Jones, 526 U.S. at 252-53 (Steven, J., concumng)). 
23 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 485 (quoting Winshi), 421 U.S. at 698) (alteration in original). 
24 See Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Essential Elements, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1467 (2001) (dis- 
cussing the Apprendi decision and developing a multi-factor test that courts can use to determine when 
a statute contains 'hon-elements" of a crime, as codified by a legislature, that in actuality appear to be 
essential elements of a crime that would otherwise necessitate the state to prove their existence beyond 
a reasonable doubt); Scott E. Sundby, The Reasonable Doubt Rule and the Meaning of Innocence, 40 
HASTINGS L. J. 457 (1989) (discussing approaches taken by courts to deal with issues raised by the 
presumption of innocence and advocating a return to the use of a broad reasonable doubt rule); see also 
Andrew J .  Fuchs, The Eflect ofApprendi v. New Jersey on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Blur- 
ring the Distinction Between Sentencing Factors and Elements o j a  Crime, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1399 
(2001) (analyzing and interpreting the Apprendi decision's impact). Fuchs provides two possible 
interpretations of the Apprendi decision; a broad interpretation that all sentencing guidelines are now 
invalidated and a narrower interpretation that the jury must decide every fact that constitutes an indi- 
vidual offense. Fuchs, supra; see also Everhart, supra note 15, at 286-93 (discussing the burdens of 
proof required for affirmative defenses as explicated by the Court). 
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defenses. Part 11 of this Article considers the historical foundation of the 
Due Process Clause and the evolution of the assignment of the burden of 
proof for affirmative defenses and sentencing factors. Part I1 also reviews 
Mullaney and its progeny through the most current case, Apprendi. Part 111 
discusses the Court's model for determining which categories of statutory 
language constitute elements requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
and which are "nonessential element[s] of an offense." Part IV evaluates 
whether it is appropriate to assign the defendant the burden of proving af- 
firmative defenses to the defendant under the post-Apprendi construct and 
considers the likelihood and wisdom of returning Mullaney to its full con- 
stitutional vigor. Ultimately, this Article concludes that while extending 
the Apprendi rule to affirmative defenses would not be inconsistent with 
recent Court decisions, it would be inappropriate because the Court's rea- 
soning for curtailing the legislature's ability to shift the burden of proof for 
sentence enhancements is not applicable to affirmative defenses. 
11. THE JUDICIAL IMITATIONS OF THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE 
A premier tenet of the American criminal justice system is that the 
prosecution has the burden of proving every element of a crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt.25 The Constitution does not specifically require the 
prosecution to bear this particular burdemZ6 However, the Supreme Court 
has interpreted the Fifih and Fourteenth Amendments to protect the ac- 
cused "against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable 
In Win~hip,~' Justice Brennan held that the Due Process Clause requires the 
prosecution to offer proof beyond a reasonable doubt of "every fact neces- 
sary to constitute the crime with which [the defendant] is charged."" In- 
25 See, e.g., United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510 (1995) (holding that "materiality" of 
statements bearing upon the crime with which the defendant is charged must be submitted to a jury for 
a determination of proof beyond a reasonable doubt); Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 278 (1993) 
(holding that the use of a definition of reasonable doubt that was previously held unconstitutional 
cannot be considered a harmless error); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197,210 (1977) (holding that 
a state need not "disprove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact constituting any and all affirmative 
defenses related to the culpability of an accused"); Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 795 (1952) (hold- 
ing that an Oregon statute requiring defendant to prove insanity defense beyond a reasonable doubt did 
not violate Due Process Clause because it did not negate the state's requirement to prove all necessary 
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt); see also Paul A. Hemesath, Proof Issues, 89 GEO. 
L.J. 1644 (2001) (summarizing the reasonable doubt standard, affirmative defenses, and presumptions 
in crimjnal jurisprudence). 
26 See Note, Reasonable Doubt: An Argument Against Dejnition, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1955,1955 
(1995) (positing that courts should not attempt to define the reasonable doubt term when explaining the 
conc t to juries). 
"47 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970); see also U.S. CONST. amend. V (stating that "[nlo 
person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law"); U.S. CONST. 
amend. XN, 1 (stating that "[nlo State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, with- 
out due process of the law"). 
28 397 U.S. 358 (1 970). 
29 Id. at 364. 
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deed, this requirement is "a pervasive, historically ingrained requirement in 
criminal trials."30 
Although Winship guaranteed the defendant strong constitutional safe- 
guards, it provided courts with little guidance regarding what facts are 
"necessary to constitute the crime . . . charged."" Legislatures and prose- 
cutors argued that the prosecutor's new burden did not extend to those as- 
pects of a crime that increased or decreased sentencing or provided excul- 
pation or justification of the crime charged.32 The Winship decision, it has 
been argued, exempts the prosecution from the burden of proving every 
element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt where sentencing factors 
and affirmative defenses are concerned.33 
The limits of the Winship decision first presented itself for clarification 
in Mullaney v. Wilbur. In Mullaney, the Supreme Court considered the 
boundaries of the Winship rule.34 The prosecution charged the defendant, 
Stillman E. Wilbur, Jr., with first-degree murder and manslaughter under 
'O State v. Thomas, 806 P.2d 689,690 (Or. 1991); see State v. Glass, 5 Or. 73 (1873). 
31 Winship, 397 U.S. at 364. 
-- 
32 In Mullaney, the state argued that Winship should not apply since the fact in question, sentenc- 
ing, does not come into issue until the jury has already determined guilt of the defendaht. Thus, the 
argument continued, the defendant's critical interests in liberty and reputation are no longer of para- 
mount concern since he is likely to lose his liberty and suffer stigmatization already. See Mullaney v. 
Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684,697 (1975). 
33 See Gerald E. Lynch, Towards A Model Penal Code, Second (Federal?): The Challenge of the 
Special Part, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 297 (1998). For many years, it has been uncertain precisely 
which determinations are sentencing factors and which are elements of the crime. Basically, as Profes- 
sor Lynch wrote, the legislature determined what constituted an element. See id. at 316-17. Once the 
legislature said that a fact was not an element necessary to constitute a crime, the stringent due process 
requirements on the prosecution ceased to exist. See id. at 323. 
An "affirmative defense" is any defense that assumes the complaint or charges to 
be correct but raises other facts that, if true, would establish a valid excuse or 
justification or a right to engage in the conduct in question. An affirmative defense 
does not concern itself with the elements of the offense at all; it concedes them. In 
effect, an affirmative defense says, "Yes, I did it, but I had a good reason." 
State v. Cohen, 568 So.2d 49,51-52 (Fla. 1990). 
Affirmative defenses are also defined by the Model Penal Code as defenses that 
are "peculiarly within the knowledge of the accused." It is easy to see why defenses 
such as insanity and self-defense constitute affirmative defenses. First, the details of 
the defense really are peculiarly within the knowledge of the accused. But the de- 
tails of the third-party guilt defense are not 'peculiarly within the knowledge of the 
accused." In fact, information concerning suspects other than the accused is often 
peculiarly within the knowledge of the police or the prosecution. 
Second, a defendant in a criminal case has no constitutional right to raise an af- 
firmative defense. Therefore, since the government has the greater right to eliminate 
the defense entirely, the government has the lesser right to place limitations or bur- 
dens of proof on the exercise of the gratuitously granted state right. But an accused 
does have a constitutional right to adduce evidence "tending to show that a third 
party committed the crime charged." Hence, because the state "lacks the greater 
power to exclude the evidence entirely," the state is also prohibited from placing 
limitations (i.e., burdens of proof) on the defendant's constitutional right to admit 
third-party guilt evidence. 
Everhart, supra note 15, at 291-92 (citations omitted). 
34 Mulloney, 421 U.S. at 697-701. 
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Maine's penal code." Although the defendant admitted to fatally assault- 
ing the victim, at trial he claimed that he attacked the victim in a "fienzy" 
which was provoked by the victim's homosexual advances.36 
The Maine Penal Code defined murder and manslaughter as separate 
crimes.37 The murder statute required the prosecution to prove that the 
defendant acted with malice.38 The manslaughter statute allowed for a 
lesser sentence than murder if the defendant killed in the heat of passion 
without express or implied mali~e. '~ At trial, the judge instructed the jury 
that if the prosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the homicide 
was intentional and unlawful, then it could presume that the defendant 
acted with malice aforethought and could find the defendant guilty of mur- 
der.40 If, however, the defendant had proved, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that he acted in the heat of passion, then the jury was required to 
find the defendant guilty of the lesser crime of man~laughter.~' Through 
his instruction, the judge presumed that the "heat of passion" language of 
the Maine manslaughter statute was an affirmative defense, proof of which 
lay with the defendant.42 The trial judge's instruction to the jury allowed 
the prosecution to rely on a presumption of implied malice, thus requiring 
the defendant to prove that he acted in the heat of passion on sudden 
prov~cation.~~ The defendant was convicted of murder and appealed."" 
On appeal to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, the defendant argued 
that he had been denied due process because he was required to negate the 
35 Id. at 685-86. 
The Maine murder statute, ME. REV. STAT. ANN., Tit. 17,§ 2651 (1964), provides: 
Whoever unlawfully kills a human being with malice aforethought, either express or 
implied, is guilty of murder and shall be punished by imprisonment for life. 
The manslaughter statute, ME. REV. STAT. ANN., Tit. 17, 8 2551 (1 964), in relevant 
part provides: 
Whoever unlawfully kills a human being in the heat of passion, on sudden provoca- 
tion, without express or implied malice aforethought . . . shall be punished by a fine 
of not more than $1,000 or by imprisonment for not more than 20 years . . . . 
Id. at 686 n.3. 
36 Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 685. The argument continued that, at most, the defendant was guilty of 
manslaughter since the act occurred in the heat of passion. Id. 
37 Id. at 686 n.3. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 686-87. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 686. 
43 See State v. Wilbur, 278 A.2d 139, 143-144 (Me. 1971). The trial court judge's jury instruc- 
tion was as follows: 
Bearing in mind, as I have said, that there has been an unlawful killing, that is one 
not justified in self defense, then the killing is presumed to be with malice afore- 
thought, and the burden is then upon the defendant, the killer, to satisfy the jury that 
it was not done with malice aforethought either express or implied. 
Id. 
44 Id. at 687. 
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element of malice aforethought by proving that he acted in heat of pas- 
sion?' He argued that malice aforethought was the sole element that dis- 
tinguished murder from manslaughter and that by having to disprove mal- 
ice aforethought, he unconstitutionally had to assume the prosecution's 
burden.46 The Maine Supreme Judicial Court disagreed with the defendant 
and affirmed his con~ict ion.~~ It found that murder and manslaughter were 
not distinct crimes but rather different degrees of the single generic offense 
of felonious homicide?' Thus, the heat of passion provision of the rnan- 
slaughter statute was an affirmative defense to the greater crime of mur- 
der?' 
The defendant appealed on a writ of habeas corpus to federal district 
court, which disagreed with the Maine Supreme Judicial Court. It ruled 
that, under the Maine statute, murder and manslaughter were distinct of- 
fenses, not different degrees of the same offense." The court found that, 
under Winship, the prosecution must prove malice aforethought beyond a 
reasonable doubt.'' The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the 
district court, subscribing in general to the court's analysis and construc- 
tion of the Maine law." On appeal, the United States Supreme Court va- 
cated the opinion and remanded it to the court of  appeal^.'^ On remand, the 
court of appeals again held that the Maine homicide statutory scheme vio- 
45 State v. Wilbur, 278 A.2d 139, 143-44 (Me. 1971). 
46 Id. at 143-44. As early as 1727, it had been held that "once the prosecution proved that the ac- 
cused had committed the homicide, it was 'incumbent upon the prisoner to make out, to the satisfaction 
of the court and jury' 'all . . . circumstances of justification, excuse or alleviation."' Mullaney, 421 
U.S. at 693-94 (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES 201); see also King v. Oneby, 92 
Eng. Rep. 465 (K.B. 1727); MICHAEL FOSTER, A REPORT OF SOME PROCEEDINGS ON THE COMM~SSION 
FOR THE TRIAL OF THE REBELS M THE YEAR 1746, W THE COUNTY OF SURRY, AND OTHER CROWN 
CASES: TO WHICH ARE ADDED D~SCOURSES UPON A FEW BRANCHES OF THE CROWN LAW 296-97 
(Michael Dodson ed., 3d ed. 1809). Thus, at common law, the burden of proving heat of passion lay 
with defendant. Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 694. In the 1975 Mullaney decision, however, the Court noted 
that a majority of states require the prosecution to prove heat of passion. Id. at 696. 
47 Wilbur, 278 A.2d at 149. 
48 Id. at 144-146. The court noted that the law over the past century has been to place the burden 
of proof on the defense to prove that the defendant acted in the heat of passion on sudden provocation. 
Id. The Wilbur court also discussed the possible application of Winship. Id. at 146. 
49 It is interesting to note that Winship was decided in 1970, four years after the defendant's trial. 
In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 358; Wilbur, 278 A.2d at 146. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court noted this 
fact, but "did not anticipate the application of the Winship principle to a factor such as the heat of 
passion on sudden provocation." Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 688. 
Wilbur v. Robbins, 349 F.Supp. 149, 152-53 (D.Me. 1972). 
51 Id. at 153. 
52 See Wilbur v. Mullaney, 473 F.2d 943 94547 (1st Cir. 1973). The court noted that "within 
broad limits a state court must be the one to interpret its own laws" but held that "a totally unsupport- 
able construction which leads to an invasion of constitutional due process is a federal matter." Id. at 
945. In the meantime, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine decided a similar case. See State v. 
Lafferty, 309 A.2d 647 (Me. 1973). The LaJerry decision reaffirmed the holding in Stare v. Wilbur, 
and rejected the First Circuit's ruling in Mullaney v. Wilbur. Id. at 661-64. In light of the conflict, the 
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 414 U.S. 1139 (1974). 
J3 Mullaney v. Wilbur, 414 U.S. 1139 (1974). 
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lated due pro~ess.'~ The Supreme Court again granted certiorari." 
Justice Powell, writing for the majority, declined to follow the analysis 
of the lower federal courts.56 Instead, Powell held that the trial judge's 
instructions erroneously placed the burden to disprove malice aforethought 
on the defen~lant.~' Interpreting the absence of malice provision in the 
Maine manslaughter statute as something other than a "fact necessary to 
constitute [an element of] the crime," as had the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Maine, was held as inconsistent with our traditional notions of homicide." 
Such a holding threatened to grant the legislature power to circumvent the 
Due Process Cla~se. '~ 
In reaching its conclusion, the majority reasoned that the history of 
punishing homicide crimes and the potential for legislative abuse necessi- 
tated its finding.60 Historically, only those homicides "committed in the 
enforcement of justice" were deemed j~stifiable.~' Eventually, the class of 
justifiable homicides was expanded.62 This expansion included "accidental 
homicides and those committed in self defense.'*3 Still, in any other case, 
no affirmative defense existed to ameliorate p~nishrnent.~ Therefore, the 
Court held that the Maine homicide statute was un~onstitutional.~' The 
Court viewed malice aforethought as an additional element that elevated 
voluntary manslaughter to murder.66 In so finding, the Court rejected the 
54 Wilbur v. Mullaney. 496 F.2d 1303,1307 (1st Cir. 1974). 
55 - - Mullaney v. Wilbur, 419 U.S. 823 (1974). 
56 Justice Powell wrote the majority opinion and was joined by the entire court: Burger, Douglas, 
Brennan, Stewart, White, Marshall. Blackmun and Rehnquist. See Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 684. Justice 
Rehnquist wrote a concurring opinion and was joined by Chief Justice Burger. Id. at 704. At the 
outset, the opinion rejected the analysis of the district court and the First Circuit, thereby accepting the 
Main5:upreme Judicial Court's construction of its state law. Id. at 690-91. 
31 Id. at 701. The Court conducted a historical analysis, thereby showing why such an approach 
is impermissible. Id. at 692-96. 
58 Id. at 696-98. The Court noted that the state impermissibly, "affirmatively shifled the burden 
of proof to the defendant." Id. at 701. It held that the "Due Pmess Clause requires the prosecution to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of the heat of passion . . . ." Id. at 704. 
59 Id. at 698-99. 
60 Id. at 692-98. 
6' Id. at 692. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 See id. Much of this history was set out in the Court's opinion in McGautha v. Cali/ornia, 402 
U.S. 183, 197-98 (1971). See also 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERJCK WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE 
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD 1 478-87 (2d ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 
1982) (1899) (explaining that, historically, homicide that was neither justifiable nor excusable was 
felonious homicide); 3 JAMES F. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL AW OF ENGLAND 1-107 
(London, MacMillan 1883) (delineating the history of the law of homicide in its two forms: murder and 
manslaughter). 
6' Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 703-04. 
66 Id. 
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petitioner's argument that the absence of malice was instead a defense to 
murder.67 
The greater concern raised by petitioner's argument was that, if ac- 
cepted, it would allow legislatures to effectively allocate the burden of 
proof for different elements of a crime.68 Petitioners argued that the Maine 
statute, by requiring the deferidant to prove by a preponderance of the evi- 
dence that the killing was committed in the heat of passion, made the heat 
of passion element an affirmative defense and thus not a "fact necessary to 
constitute the crime" of felonious murder.69 The Court soundly rejected 
this position.70 It reasoned that acceptance of the petitioner's argument 
would extend Winship beyond its original intent.7' If legislatures were 
permitted to label elements as those essential to prove a crime or as those 
available to a defendant as affirmative defenses, they would be able to cir- 
cumvent the process of proof.72 
In Patterson v. New ~ork,'~ the Court refused to apply Mullaney, hold- 
ing that the defense of extreme emotional disturbance, an expanded notion 
of heat of passion, did not negate an element of the crime of murder.74 
Defendant Gordon Patterson shot and killed his estranged wife's boyhend 
after spotting her "in a state of semiundress" in front of the victim. 75 The 
defendant was charged with violating section 125.25 of the New York Pe- 
nal Law which provides, in relevant part, that: 
67 Id. at 697-98. The Court argued that the State was not concerned "only with guilt or innocence 
in the abstract but also with the degree of culpability." Id. The law distinguishes those who kill in the 
heat of passion from those who do not. Id. at 698. Therefore, the state views the former as "less 
blameworthy." Id. 
68 Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 698-99. 
69 Id. at 697 (citing Winship, 397 U.S. at 364). 
70 Id. at 697-701. 
7' Id. at 698 (stating that "Maine denigrates the interests found critical in Winship"). The Court 
stated that Winship is concerned with substance rather than formalism. Id. at 699. Under the Winship 
analysis, a court should look at the law as applied. Id. 
" See Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 698-99. The State could therefore undermine many interests the 
Winshi decision sought to protect. See id. 
"432 U.S. I97 (1977). 
74 Id. at 205-10. The Court noted that extreme emotional distress is a considerably expanded ver- 
sion of the heat of passion defense. Id. at 202. With the adoption of the Model Penal Code, the Ameri- 
can Law Institute ("ALI") departed from the heat of passion defense. See MODEL PENAL CODE 5 210.3 
(1962). They adopted "extreme mental or emotional disturbance" as a defense to criminal homicide 
that would mitigate a murder charge to manslaughter. Patterson, 432 U.S. at 202. The test is whether, 
"from the viewpoint of a person in the actor's situation under the circumstances as he believes them to 
be," the homicide was committed, "under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for 
which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse." Id. The test, therefore, includes both a subjective 
element and an objective element. Whereas the test looks at the situation that gave rise to the extreme 
emotional disturbance as the actor believed it to be, it must be reasonable that the event gave rise to the 
extreme emotional disturbance. See 1 MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTAJUES, pt 2, at 50. This 
new formulation of the law has created a larger class of cases that may be treated as manslaughter, 
which would have otherwise been murder. Id. at 49. 
75 Patterson, 432 U.S. at 198. The defendant responded to the sight by shooting the boyfriend 
twice in the head. Id. 
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A person is guilty of murder in the second degree when: 
1. With intent to cause the death of another person, he 
causes the death of such person or of a third person; ex- 
cept that in any prosecution under this subdivision, it is an 
affirmative defense that: 
(a) The defendant acted under the influence of ex- 
treme emotional disturbance for which there 
was a reasonable explanation or excuse, the rea- 
sonableness of which is to be determined from 
the viewpoint of a person in the defendant's 
situation under the circumstances as the defen- 
dant believed them to be. Nothing contained in 
this paragraph shall constitute a defense to a 
prosecution for, or preclude a conviction of, 
manslaughter in the first degree or any other 
crime . . . . 76 
The defendant was convicted at trial and the Appellate Division af- 
finned his con~ic t ion .~~ The defendant appealed to the New York Court of 
Appeals arguing that the statutory requirement that he prove extreme emo- 
tional dist~rbance'~ violated his right to due process.79 The New York 
Court of Appeals rejected the defendant's argument and held that the stat- 
ute was consistent with due process.80 
The defendant appealed directly to the Supreme Court." The Court 
analyzed the New York statute and defined the extreme emotional distur- 
bance element as a mitigating circumstance, thereby undermining the prin- 
ciples embodied in Win~hip.'~ Justice White, writing for the majority, held 
that those elements that a legislature defines as exculpatory or mitigating 
do not negate an element of the substantive crime.83 Therefore, such a 
76 N.Y. PENAL AW 8 125.25 (1998). 
77 Patterson, 432 U.S. at 200. 
78 At trial, the jury was charged that the defendant had the burden of proving his affirmative de- 
fense b a preponderance of the evidence. Id. 
7J See People v. Patterson, 347 N.E.2d 898, 902 (N.Y. 1976). The court noted that while Patter- 
son's a peal was pending, the United States Supreme Court decided Wilbur v. Mullaney. Id. 
s f  Id. at 907. The court distinguished Mullaney on the ground that the New York statute did not 
shift the burden to the defendant to disprove any fact essential to the offense charged. Id. Specifically, 
in New York, the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance bears no direct relationship to 
any element of murder. Id. at 907-08. 
" See Patterson v. New York, 429 U.S. 813 (1976) (noting probable jurisdiction). 
82 See Patterson, 432 U.S. at 207. The Court explained that the defense allows a defendant to 
show mental infirmity, which demonstrates less culpability. Id. at 206. 
83 The Court declined to hold that a 
[sltate must prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact, the existence or nonexis- 
tence of which it is willing to recognize as an exculpatory or mitigating circumstance 
affecting the degree of culpability or the severity of the punishment. Here, in revis- 
ing its criminal code, New York provided the affirmative defense of extreme emo- 
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statute does not violate a defendant's due process  right^.^ The Court noted 
that the legislature had taken great pains to ensure that innocent men would 
not be convicted by placing a substantial burden on the prose~ution?~ 
However, "the risk [the prosecution] must bear is not without limits," and 
"due process does not require that every conceivable step be taken, at 
whatever cost, to eliminate the possibility of convicting an innocent per- 
son."86 The majority declined to "adopt as a constitutional imperative, op- 
erative countqwde, that a State must disprove beyond a reasonable doubt 
every fact constituting any and all afirmative defenses related to the cul- 
pability of an ac~used."~' 
The majority distinguished Patterson from ~ul laney.8~ In the Maine 
murder statute malice was the absence of provocation and, therefore, re- 
quired the defendant to prove provocation as an element of the crimeaS9 In 
contrast, the New York statute-did not presume or imply extreme emotional 
disturban~e,~ a concept that did not have deep historic roots in common 
law?' Thus, according to the Patterson Court the extreme emotional dis- 
tional disturbance, a substantially expanded version of the older heatsf-passion con- 
cept; but it was willing to do so only if the facts making out the defense were estab- 
lished by the defendant with sufficient certainty. The State was itself unwilling to 
undertake to establish the absence of those facts beyond a reasonable doubt, perhaps 
fearing that proof would be too dimcult and that too many persons deserving treat- 
ment as murderers would escape that punishment if the evidence need merely raise a 
reasonable doubt about the defendant's emotional state. 
Id. at 207. Justice Powell wrote for the dissent, joined by Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall. Id. at 
216. Justice Rehnauist took no Dart in the decision. Id. 
84 ~ a t t e r s o n , ' ~ ~  U.S. at'210 (stating that the "Due Process Clause requires the prosecution to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements included in the definition of the offense of which 
the defendant is charged") Since "proof of the nonexistence of all affirmative defenses has never been 
constitutionally required," the Court was unwilling to depart from this standard. Id. 
Id. at 208 (pointing out that this comes with the social cost that some guilty people will go 
free). 
86 Id. 
Id. at 210 (relying, again, on the fact that proof of the nonexistence of all affirmative defenses 
has never been required in the past). 
"Id. at 215-16. 
See id. at 2 16; see also supra text accompanying 40-41. 
90 Patterson, 432 U.S. at 216. 
91 At first, "the common law did not distinguish between murder and manslaughter." MODEL PE- 
NAL CODE 6 210.3 cmt. 3 (1980). Later, courts began to make the distinction that murder required 
"malice aforethought" while manslaughter did not. Id. Traditionally, then, manslaughter was the 
absence of malice aforethought, but not a justification or excuse for the act. Id. The common law 
further defined manslaughter as an intentional killing committed in the "heat of passion." Id. In the 
Model Penal Code, extreme emotional disturbance was developed as a defense to murder from the 
traditional heat of passion defense. See id. Thus, extreme emotional disturbance is a relatively new 
defense. Just as heat of passion constituted manslaughter, extreme emotional disturbance mitigated a 
murder charge to manslaughter. When New York adopted its current criminal code, it appropriated 
almost word-for-word, the ALI formulation of extreme emotional disturbance in the Model Penal Code. 
See N.Y. PENAL LAW 125.25 (1998). 
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turbance provision did not negate an element of the New York murder stat- 
~ t e . ' ~  
Justice Powell, who two years earlier had written for the overwhelming 
majority in ~ul laney:~ wrote the dissent in Patterson, joined by Breman 
and MarshallY4 According to the dissent, the majority opinion opened the 
door to the very threats about which Justice Powell had warned in Mul- 
l~ney.~ '  Powell wrote, "in the name of preserving legislative flexibility, the 
court today drains In Re Winship of much of its vitality" and "surrenders to 
the legislative branch a significant part of its responsibility to protect the 
presumption of inr~ocence."~~ The Maine and New York Statues were 
similar in that both provided the defendant with a less severe punishment 
for acting in response to emotion." Powell recognized that the very rea- 
sons for its decision in Mullaney were vitiated in the majority's decision in 
Patter~on?~ By paying deference to the New York State Legislature and 
upholding its definition of extreme emotional distress as an affirmative 
defense to murder, the majority decision allowed "a legislature to shift, 
virtually at will, the burden of persuasion with respect to any factor in a 
criminal case, so long as it is careful not to mention the nonexistence of 
that factor in the statutory language that defines the crime."99 Following 
Patterson, states could "undermine" the Winship decision by redefining 
elements to constitute different crimes.Iw 
In McMillan v. ~ennsylvania,'~' the Court first coined the phrase "sen- 
92 See Patterson, 432 U.S. at 215-16. Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or deci- 
sion of the case. Id. 
93 Mullanev. 421 U.S. at 684. 
.. 
94 Patterson, 432 U.S. at 216 (Powell, J., dissenting), 
95 See id. at 221. Powell questioned how the Court could hold that the defendant's burden to 
prove the heat of passion in Mullaney was invalid, while upholding New York's statute which requires 
the defendant to prove extreme emotional distress. See id. at 221-22. Powell felt the difference be- 
tween the statutes was "formalistic rather than substantive." Id. 
96 Id. at 216 (Powell, J., dissenting ). 
" ~ d .  at 199,212-213. 
See id. at 224-25 (Powell, J., dissenting) (stating that "[ilt would be preferable, if the Court has 
found reason to reject the rationale of Winship and Mullaney, simply and straightforwardly to overrule 
those precedents"). Powell went through a detailed analysis of why the case is similar to Mullaney and 
requires the same conclusion. Id. 
99 Id. at 223. 
loo Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 698 (stating that "if Winship were limited to those facts that constitute a 
crime as define by state law, a State could undermine many of the interests that decision sought to 
protect. . . ."). 
lo' 477 U.S. 79 (1986). The petitioners, of whom there were four, were convicted of various 
felonies enumerated in section 9712 of the Pennsylvania Code. Id. at 80. Under section 9712, the 
petitioners were subject to a mandatory minimum five-year sentence if found by a preponderance of the 
evidence to have visibly possessed a firearm. Id. at 81. The petitioners were convicted and, on appeal, 
challenged the constitutionality of the statute. Id. at 83. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected the 
petitioners' argument and upheld the statute. Id. 
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tencing factor"'02 and considered whether proof of sentencing factor ele- 
ments, like affirmative defenses, are exempt under Winship.lo3 Specifi- 
cally, the Court considered whether Pennsylvania's Mandatory Minimum 
Sentencing Act (the "Pennsylvania Act")lo4 violated the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it permitted punishment for 
certain enumerated felonies to a mandatory minimum sentence of five 
years imprisonment if the sentencing judge found by a preponderance of 
the evidence that the person "visibly possessed a fireann during commis- 
sion of the ~ffense."'~' The legislation's language specifically provided 
that "visible possession" was a sentence enhancement provision and not an 
element of the crime.lo6 
The issue in McMillan arose when four sentencing judges at separate 
sentencing hearings, struck down the Pennsylvania Act because it did not 
allow the jury to evaluate the element of "visible possession," which leads 
directly to p~nishrnent. '~~ The Commonwealth appealed and the Supreme 
Court of Pennsylvania reversed, concluding that the Pennsylvania ~ c t  was 
constitutional and consistent with due process.Io8 Justice Rehnquist wrote 
lo2 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 485 (stating that "[ilt was in McMillan v. Pennsylvania [ ] that this 
Court, for the first time, coined the term 'sentencing factor'. . . ."). Andrew Fuchs argued that Ap- 
prendi "should be interpreted narrowly and need not invalidate the Guidelines because [it] does not 
require juries to make Guidelines determinations using a reasonable doubt standard." Fuchs, supra 
note 24, at 1400-01 (2001). Fuchs posited: 
Sentencing factors are determinations impacting the length of a defendant's sentence 
that a judge, rather than a jury, makes using the preponderance of the evidence stan- 
dard. For example, after the jury has already convicted a defendant, judges routinely 
decide the existence of such sentencing factors as narcotics quantity, whether anyone 
was injured during the commission of the crime, the extent of victim injury, or 
whether a weapon was involved. 
Id. at 1400 (internal citations omitted). 
'03 McMillan, 477 U.S. at 83. 
I W  42 PA. CONS. STAT. 8 9712 (West 1998). 
lo' McMillan, 477 U.S. at 81 (quoting 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 4 9712 (West 1998)). 
Io6 The Pennsylvania Legislature specifically included language to prevent the due process chal- 
lenge as well as to respond to the Supreme Court's holding in Patterson. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. 
ANN. 8 97 12(b) (West 1998): 
Provisions of this section shall not be an element of the crime and notice thereof to 
the defendant shall not be required prior to conviction, but reasonable notice of the 
Commonwealth's intention to proceed under this section shall be provided after con- 
viction and before sentencing. The applicability of this section shall be determined 
at sentencing. The court shall consider any evidence presented at trial and shall af- 
ford the Commonwealth and the defendant an opportunity to present any necessary 
additional evidence and shall determine, by a preponderance of the evidence, if this 
section is applicable. 
Id. 
107 See McMillan, 477 U.S. at 82 (citing sentencing hearings). 
108 See Commonwealth v. Wright, 494 A.2d 354, 362-63 (Pa. 1985). The court noted that the 
legislature has the responsibility of defining elements of crimes. Id. at 357. Furthermore, per the 
Crimes Code, an element of an offense is conduct, attendant circumstances, or a result of conduct that 
is included in the description of the offense, establishes the required kind of culpability, negates an 
excuse or justification, negates a defense under the statute of limitations or establishes jurisdiction or 
venue. See id. Because visible possession of a firearm is not included in the definitions of the felonies 
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that the Constitution did not limit a state's power to define "elements" as 
sentencing factors, and therefore, allowed removal of such "eleinents" 
from the reasonable doubt ~ tandard . '~  
The McMillan decision marked the Court's commitment to deferring to 
the legislature's definition of a substantive crime. Relying heavily on Pat- 
terson, Justice Rehnquist noted that the Due Process Clause did not require 
the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt any element that de- 
fines the "severity of punishment" of a particular crime."0 The Court held 
that "the State legislature's definition of the elements of an offense is usu- 
ally dispositive." Therefore, the Court should limit its inquiry to whether 
the legislature's decision to assign the label of sentencing factor to an 
element of a crime violated the Due Process Clause."' The Court opined, 
"it goes without saying that preventing and dealing with crime is much 
more the business of the States than the Federal G~vernment.""~ Here, 
since the State had specifically stated that the "visible possession of a 
weapon" element was not an element of the crime, it complied with the 
Patterson requirements and, therefore, it was fair to require proof by a pre- 
ponderance of the evidence."' 
Thus, following McMillan: (1) the legislature's decision to link the se- 
verity of the punishment to the presence or absence of an identified fact did 
not automatically subject that fact to the Winship requirements; and (2) 
courts should consider the state legislature's definition of the element of 
enumerated in section 9712 and it does not establish culpability required under those definitions, it is 
clearly not an element of an offense. Id. Additionally, section 9712 applies only after a defendant has 
been convicted of one of the enumerated felonies; therefore, f 9712 applies solely to sentencing pro- 
ceedings. Id. In concluding that section 9712 violated the Due Process Clause, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court stated: 
The effect of section 971 2 is merely to limit the discretion of the sentencing court in 
the selection of a minimum sentence where it is determined that the defendant visi- 
bly possessed a fireann during the commission of the crime. The maximum permis- 
sible term of imprisonment remains unaffected. The defendant has no cognizable 
right to leniency: Thus, although a finding that this particular sentencing Tactor is 
present may have serious consequences for the defendant, we do not believe that a 
defendant is subject to a section 9712 proceeding is in a position significantly distin- 
guishable from that of other convicted defendants during the sentencing phase. 
Id. at 362. 
Io9 McMillan, 477 U.S. at 86-87 (Justice Rehnquist noting that there are constitutional limits, 
though not precisely defined in Patterson, to the State's power to define elements as sentencing fac- 
tors). One such example is that the Due Process Clause precludes States from discarding the presump- 
tion of innocence. Id. at 87. 
' lo  See McMillan, 477 U.S. at 84. 
I l l  Id. at 85 (noting that "[wlhile 'there are obviously constitutional limits beyond which the 
States may not go in this regard . . . [tlhe applicability of the reasonable doubt standard . . . has always 
been depended on how a State defines the offense that is charged in any given case."') (quoting Patter- 
son, 432 U.S. at 21 l n.12). 
112 Id. (quoting lwinc v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 134 (1954)). 
113 See id. at 85-86 (stating that "the present case is controlled by Patterson . . . rather than Mul- 
laney. . . . [The] Pennsylvania Legislature has expressly provided that visible possession of a firearm is 
not an elements of the crime[r). 
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the offense as dispositive.'14 The Court left unclear the precise constitu- 
tional limits of a legislature's power to define the elements on an of- 
fense."' 
The Court distinguished the Mullaney decision by concluding that 
"[slection 9712 neither alter[ed] the maximum penalty for a crime nor 
creat[ed] a separate offense, calling for a separate ~enalty.""~ Instead, "it 
operat[ed] solely to limit the sentencing court's discretion in assigning a 
penalty within range already available to it without the special finding of 
visible possession of a Therefore, following McMillan, courts 
were limited in their ability to look far behind a legislature's rationale in 
defining an element of a crime."' 
Justice Stevens, in his dissent, raised concern that the McMillan deci- 
sion did not comport with the Court's decision in Winship.Il9 He con- 
cluded that the factual finding of visibly possessing a firearm identified 
"conduct that the legislature specifically intended to prohibit and to punish 
by a special san~tion." '~~ According to Justice Stevens, 
[Alppropriate respect for the rule of In re Winship requires 
that there be some constitutional limits on the power of a 
State to define the elements of criminal offenses. The high 
standard of proof is required because of the immense impor- 
tance of the individual interest in avoiding both the loss of 
liberty and the stigma that results from a criminal conviction . 
. . . [I]f a State provides that a specific component of a pro- 
'I4 Id. at 84-85. 
' I 5  McMillan, 477 U.S. at 91 (finding that "[olur inability to lay down any 'bright line' test may 
leave the constitutionality of statutes more like those in Mullaney . . . than is the Pennsylvania statute [,I 
to depend on differences of degree, but the law is full of situations in which differences of degree 
produce different results"). 
l i 6  Id. at 87-88. 
' I 7  Id. at 88 (stating that "[tlhe statute gives no impression of having been tailored to permit the 
visible possession finding to be a tail which wags the dog of the substantive offense"). In rejecting the 
petitioners' arguments, the Court noted that the statute does not expose one to greater or additional 
vunishment. See id. 
"' In his dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall stated "[wlhether a particular fact is an element of a 
criminal offense that . . . must be proved by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt is a question 
that must be decided by this Court and cannot be abdicated to the States." McMillan, 477 U.S. at 93 
(Marshall, J., dissenting). He also noted that he would not rely on the distinction between aggravating 
and mitigating facts, stating that he "would put off until next Term, [when the court determines Martin 
v. Ohio] any discussion of how mitigating facts should be analyzed under Winship." Id. at 94. Mar- 
shall agreed with Justice Stevens' opinion which stated that "if a State provides that a specific compo- 
nent of a prohibited transaction shall give rise both to a special stigma and to a special punishment, that 
component must be treated as a 'fact necessary to constitute the crime' within the meaning of the hold- 
ing in In re Winship." Id. 
McMillan, 477 U.S. at 103 (Stevens, J. ,  dissentinn). 
. . -. 
I2O Id. at 103-04. Justice Stevens wrote: "ln my opinion the Constitutional significance of the 
special sanction cannot be avoided by the cavalier observation that it merely 'ups the ante' for the 
defendant. No matter how culpable petitioner Denniston may be, the difference between 1 l '/r months 
and 5 years of incarceration merits a more principled justification . . . ." Id. at 104 (citation omitted). 
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hibited transaction shall give rise both to a special stigma and 
to a special punishment, that component must be treated as a 
"fact necessary to constitute the crime" within the meaning of 
our holding in In re Winship.'" 
In deviating from the principle of Winship, Mullaney and Patterson, the 
majority decision circumvented due process by allowing the legislature to 
define aspects of a crime that lead directly to punishment, but absolved the 
prosecution of the highest burden of proof.'22 
In Martin v. Ohio,123 the Supreme Court continued its policy of defer- 
ring to the legislature's decision to define which elements the prosecution 
must prove, and which the prosecution need not prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt.lZ4 In Martin, the Court considered whether the Ohio legislature's 
decision to label self-defense as an afirmative defense violated the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth ~mendment."~ Ohio's aggravated mu- 
der statute made it a crime to purposely, and without prior calculation and 
design, cause the death of another.Iz6 The state's self-defense statute pro- 
vided an affirmative defense to the defendant if she could prove by a pre- 
ponderance of the evidence that (1) she honestly believed she was in irnmi- 
nent danger of death or great bodily harm; (2) that her only means of es- 
cape was to use force; and (3) that she had satisfied any duty to retreat or 
avoid danger.''' The defendant, who was charged with shooting her hus- 
band, allegedly in response to a heated argument, claimed that the state 
unconstitutionally shifted the burden of proving self-defense to the defen- 
dant, since self-defense negates the "unlawfulness" implicit in every 
crime.'" The Ohio Supreme Court rejected defendant's arg~rnent"~ and 
the defendant petitioned the Supreme Court for writ of certiorari.130 The 
''I Id. at 103. 
See id. at 91 -92. 
"' 480 U.S. 228 (1987b 
. , 
See id. at 232-33. 
Id. at 230 (questioning "whether the Due Process Clause . . . forbids placing the burden of 
provin selfdefense on the defendant"). 
I t  OHIO REV. CODE 8 2903.01 (Anderson 2002). 
12' OHIO REV. CODE !j 2901 .OS(A) states: 
Every person accused of an offense is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond 
a reasonable doubt, and the burden of proof for all elements of the offense is upon 
the prosecution. The burden of going forward with the evidence of an affirmative 
defense, and the burden of proof, by a preponderance of the evidence, for an affirma- 
tive defense, is upon the accused. 
Id. 
'" See Martin, 480 U.S. at 231. The defendant and her husband had fought over grocery money. 
during which the defendant claimed her husband hit her in the head. Id. at 230-31. According to the 
defendant, the victim came towards her as she was heading upstairs to retrieve her husband's rifle. See 
idat 231. 
State v. Martin, 488 N.E.2d 166, 169 (Ohio 1986). 
"O Martin v. Ohio, 475 U.S. 11 19 (1986). 
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Supreme Court agreed with Ohio's highest court, concluding that the deci- 
sion to define self-defense as an affirmative defense "founders on State 
law,""' and that since the elements of murder and self-defense do not over- 
lap, the legislature's decision to assign the burden of proving self-defense 
to a defendant did not run afoul of the C~nstitution.'~~ 
In a strongly worded dissent, Justice Powell concluded that the major- 
ity decision was flawed since it granted too much deference to the Ohio 
1egislat~re.I~~ The majority failed to look beyond the Ohio legislature's 
decision to shift the burden to the defen~lant."~ The language of "prior 
calculation or design" suggests that a defendant must have premeditated 
the lulling.135 In contrast, under self-defense, the defendant must prove 
imminent danger of death or great bodily harm.'36 Someone in imminent 
danger, who is threatened with great bodily harm, does not have time to 
form a prior intent to Consequently, proof of self-defense negates 
the premeditation element of the Ohio murder statute.I3' Powell noted that 
the Patterson decision was predicated on the Court's conclusion that the 
defense of extreme emotional disturbance did not negate an element of 
New York's murder s ta t~te ."~ In contrast, the defense of self-defense was 
more analogous to the situation presented to the Court in Mullaney, where 
proof of a "heat of passion" supported a conclusion that a defendant could 
not act with malice aforeth~ught. '~~ Thus, under Mullaney and Patterson, 
the Court should have concluded that the Due Process clause prohibits the 
defendant from having the responsibility to prove this element of the 
crime.I4' 
Powell, who was in the majority in Mullaney and dissented in Patter- 
son, outlined what he thought would be the proper two-pronged test for 
evaluating whether the legislature properly relieved the defendant of the 
13' Martin, 480 U.S. at 235. 
132 See id. at 234. One example of when a state's decision would run afoul of the Constitution is 
"if the jury had been instructed that selfdefense evidence could not be considered in determining 
whether there was a reasonable doubt about the State's case." Id. at 233. That is, if selfdefense "must 
be put aside for all purposes unless it satisfied the preponderance standard." Id. at 233-34. 
'33 Id. at 236,240 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
134 See id. at 241. Powell argued that the Court had "significantly, and without explanation" ex- 
tended the deference granted to state legislation. Id. at 240. Generally, Powell felt the majority ignored 
the real meaning of the holding in Patterson. Id. at 239. 
13' See id. at 238. This elements is satisfied only when the accused has engaged in a "definite 
process of reasoning in advance of the killing." Id. 
'''See id. 
13' ~ d .  at 239. 
138 Id. 
13' Id. at 240. 
140 See Mullaney, 42 1 U.S. 684-85. 
14' Martin, 480 U.S. at 239 (stating that "[iln many cases, a defendant who finds himself in im- 
minent danger and reacts with deadly force will have not formed a prior intent to kill"). 
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highest burden of proof.I4' His test took into account his concern that Mar- 
tin granted the legislature too much discretion and that it ignored the his- 
torical treatment of problems of proof.IJ3 According to Powell, a state has 
discretion to decide who has the burden of proving an element of a crime 
if: (1) the factor does not make a difference between guilt and innocence; 
and (2) the factor in question has not historically held that importance.t44 
Under this analysis, generally courts cannot grant blanket deference to the 
legislature in matters that trigger due process concerns and specifically, 
courts cannot allow a state to put the burden of self-defense on the defen- 
dant.'45 
In Alrnendarez-Torres v. United  state^,'"^ the Supreme Court applied 
the PattersodMullaney construct to federal legislation when it considered 
whether Congress could properly define a recidivist provision in an illegal 
immigration statute as a sentence enhancement rather than a "fact neces- 
sary to constitute the ~rirne."'~' Congress had enacted 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), 
which authorized a prison term of no more than two years for any person 
who was once deported and returns to the United States without permis- 
sion.I4' Section 1326 created a recidivist provision, permitting a prison 
term of up to twenty years if the previous deportation was subsequent to a 
conviction for commission of an aggravated fe10ny.I~~ Almendarez-Torres 
was previously convicted of three aggravated fe10nies.I~~ Subsequently, he 
was in the United States and charged and convicted under 1326(a).lS1 At 
his sentencing hearing, the defendant argued that his indictment failed to 
identify the three previous convictions and therefore did not set forth the 
elements of the crime as required under 1326(b)(2).Is2 He argued, there- 
I4'See id. at 242 (stating "the State's authority in this respect was elaborated in the Patterson dis- 
sent, where I proposed a two-& inquiry"). 
143 Id. 
'44 Id. (holding that "[ilf either branch of the test is not met, then the legislature retains its tradi- 
tional authority over matters of proof') (quoting Patterson, 432 U.S. at 226-27). 
145 See id. at 242-43 (noting that "[ulnder this analysis, it plainly is impermissible to require the 
accused to prove self-defense."). 
523 U.S. 224 (1998). 
. . 
14' Id. at 239. However, Winship "did not consider whether, or when, the Constitution requires 
the Government to treat a particular fact as an element, i.e., as a 'fact necessary to constitute the crime,' 
even where the crime-defining statute does not do so." Id. at 240. The issue before the Almendarez- 
Torres court was whether it was a violation of the defendant's due process for the hial court to treat the 
provisions of 8 U.S.C. 8 1325@)(2) as sentence enhancements, rather than elements of the crime. Id. at 
226. 
148 8 U.S.C. 8 1326(a) (2000). 
14' Id. at 4 1326@)(2) (stating that if an alien's removal "was subsequent to a conviction for 
commission of an aggravated felony, such alien shall be fined under such title, imprisoned not 
more than 20 years, or both"). 
150 See Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 227. 
151 Id. 
Id. 
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fore, that he could not be sentenced to more than two years in jail.Is3 The 
district court rejected his argument, concluding that the provisions of § 
1326(b)(2) were merely sentence  enhancement^."^ On appeal, the Fifth 
Circuit also rejected defendant's argument, relying on decisions by seven 
of its sister circuits, which held that § 1326(b)(2) was merely a sentencing 
pr~vision."~ The Ninth Circuit, however, was in disagreement as to 
whether Congress had the authority to define a recidivist statute as a sen- 
tence enhancement. As such, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to re- 
solve the split among j~risdictions.'~~ 
The Court stated that, within certain limits, it was Congress's preroga- 
tive to decide which factors were relevant to defining a crime and which 
factors were relevant to sentencing.'" Moreover, the Court interpreted 
Congress's intent as treating recidivism as a sentencing factor, not an ele- 
ment of the offense.'58 In addition, the Court recognized the consequences 
of considering the "aggravated felony" language as an element of the 
crime.'59 If such were the case, it would create undue prejudice to the de- 
fendant. la Requiring the prosecution to prove recidivism would obligate it 
to present evidence at trial of defendant's prior con~ictions.'~' According 
IS3 Id. 
See id. The district court, consistent with the applicable sentencing guidelines range, imposed 
a sentence of 85 months' imprisonment. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 8 2LI.2 (2002). 
IS5 United States v. Almendarez-Torres, 113 F.3d 515 (19%); see also United States v. Valdez, 
103 F.3d 95 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that reentry after deportation after conviction of a crime is a 
sentencing enhancement, not a separate offense); United States v. Haggerty, 85 F.3d 403 (8th Cir. 
1996) (same); United States v. DeLeon-Rodriguez, 70 F.3d 764 (3d. Cir. 1995) (same); United States v. 
Palacios-Casquete, 55 F.3d 557 (1 lth Cir. 1995) (same); United States v. Munoz-Cerna, 47 F.3d 207 
(7th Cir. 1995) (same); United States v. Cole, 32 F.3d 16 (2d. Cir. 1994) (same); United States v. Craw- 
ford, 18 F.3d 1173 (4th Cir. 1994) (same); United States v. Forbes, 16 F.3d 1294 (1st Cir. 1994) 
(same ; United States v. Vasquez-Olvera, 999 F.2d 943 (5th Cir. 1993) (same). 
' S e e  Almendarez-Torres. 523 U.S. at 227-28; United States v. Gmlez-Medina, 976 F.2d 570. 
572 (91h Cir. 1992) (holding that subsection @)(2) constitutes a separate crime) 
See Almendarez-Torres. 523 U.S. at 228. The Court considered the legislative intent of the 
statute to determine whether the "aggravated felony" provision of 1326@)(2) was merely a sentenc- 
ing factor which authorized an enhanced penalty. Id. To decide whether this was a sentencing factor, 
the Court looked to the statute's "language, structure, subject matter, context, and history-factors that 
 typical!^ help courts determine a statute's objective and thereby illuminate its text." Id. 
158 See id. at 230. The Court noted that "the lower courts have almost uniformly interpreted stat- 
utes (that authorize higher sentences for recidivists) as setting forth sentencing factors, not as creating 
new crimes (at least where the conduct, in the absence of recidivism, is independently lawful)." Id.; 
see, e.g., United States v. Arango-Montoya, 61 F.3d 1331, 1339 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that a provi- 
sion "requiring a doubling of the mandatory minimum sentence . . . . was intended to be a sentencing 
enhancement provision"); United States v. McGatha, 891 F.2d 1520 (1 lth Cir. 1990) (holding that "a 
statute establishing increased penalties . . . . did not establish [a] new criminal offense, but was [a] mere 
sentence enhancement provision"); United States v. Jackson, 824 F.2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that 
the Armed Career Criminal Act "is a sentencing enhancement provision, but does not create a separate 
indictable offense"). 
Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 234-35. 
'60 Id. at 235. 
16' See id. (stating that the "introduction of evidence of a defendant's prior crimes risks signifi- 
cant prejudice"); see also Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554,560-61 (1998). 
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to the Court, it was not Congress's intent to create such unfaimess for the 
defendant. 
Justice Scalia, in his dissent, wrote that the congressional scheme 
clearly defined two separate crimes, one for entering the country without a 
previous conviction and one for entering the country with a previous con- 
v i~ t i0n . I~~ Moreover, the legislative scheme did not label § 1326@)(2) as a 
sentence enhancement. Thus, according to Scalia, the issue before the 
Court was not a constitutional one, but merely one of statutory interpreta- 
t i ~ n . ' ~ ~  Under this conception, the Court would have to find in favor of the 
defendant.I6' 
Justice Scalia felt that the majority's blanket deference to Congress 
"ignore[d] or distorte[d] [the analysis of] ~ c ~ i l l a n . " ' ~ ~  Unlike the statute 
in McMillan, where the legislature had identified the provision in question 
as a sentence enhancement, 8 1326(b)(2) had not been labeled as 
Moreover, McMillan "merely limited the sentencing judge's discretion 
within the range of penalty already available . . . ." unlike 5 1326(b)(2), 
which substantially increased the defendant's potential sentence.I6' Ac- 
cording to Justice Scalia, the majority's failure to sufficiently evaluate 
Congress' rationale and appreciate the treatment of prior convictions in 
which the maximum punishment is increased, as elements of the crime 
threatened to substantially undermine the Court's prior interpretation of the 
Due Process C1au~e.I~~ 
In Jones v. United States,'70 the Court began to retreat from Patterson 
and Almendarez-Torres. In Jones, the defendants held up the victims and 
16* See Almendarer-Torres, 523 U.S. at 235 (stating that "we do not believe, other things being 
equal, that Congress would have wanted to create this kind of unfaimess in respect to facts that are 
almost never contended"). 
163 See id. at 249 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justices Stevens, Souter and Ginsburg also dissented. Id. 
at 248. 
164 Id. at 248 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
las Id. 
166 See id. at 253 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
16' Id. at 249 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
168 Id. at 256. 
Id. (noting that "many State Supreme Courts have concluded that a prior conviction which in- 
creases maximum punishment must be m t e d  as an element of the offense under either their State 
Constitutions"); see, e.g., Roberson v. State, 362 P.2d 11 15,1118- 11 19 (0kla.Crim.App. 1961); State 
v. McClay, 78 A.2d 347352-54 (Me. 1951); State v. Furth, 104 P.2d 925,930-933 (Wash. 1940); State 
ex rel. Lockmiller v. Mayo, 101 SO. 228,231 (Fla. 1924); Tuttle v. Commonwealth, 68 Mass. 505,506 
(1 854) (prior conviction increasing maximum sentence must be set forth in indictment). As a matter of 
common law, see, for example, State v. Pennye, 427 P.2d 525, 525-27 (Ariz. 1967); State v. Water- 
house, 307 P.2d 327,331-33 (Or. 1957); Robbins v. State, 242 S.W.2d 640,64344 (Ark. 1951); State 
v. Eichler, 83 N.W.2d 576, 579-80 (lowa 1957); People v. McDonald, 206 N.W. 516, 518-20 (Mich. 
1925); People ex rel. Cosgriff v. Craig, 88 N.E. 3 8 , 3 9 4  (N.Y. 1909); State v. Smith, 106 N.W. 187, 
188 (lowa 1906) ("By the uniform current of authority, the fact of the prior convictions is to be taken as 
part of the offense instantly charged, at least to the extent of aggravating it and authorizing an increased 
punishment"). 
170 526 U.S. 227 (1998). 
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struck one in the head with a gun.I7' The defendants were charged with 
violating 18 U.S.C. 8 21 19, which provided: 
Whoever, with the intent to cause death or serious bodily 
harm takes a motor vehicle that has been transported, 
shipped, or received in interstate or foreign commerce from 
the person or presence of another by force and violence or by 
intimidation, or attempts to do so, shall- 
(1) be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 
15 years, or both, 
(2) if serious bodily injury (as defined in section 1365 
of this title, including any conduct that, if the con- 
duct occurred in the special maritime and territorial 
jurisdiction of the United States, would violate sec- 
tion 2241 or 2242 of this title) results, be fined un- 
der this title or imprisoned not more than 25 years, 
or both, and 
(3) if death results, be fined under this title or impris- 
oned for any number of years up to life, or both, or 
sentenced to death."' 
At the sentencing hearing, the prosecution asked for a sentence of 
twenty-five years because one of the victims had suffered serious bodily 
inj~ry."~ The defendant objected since sub-section (2) of the statute de- 
fined serious bodily injury as an element of the crime and the prosecution 
had not pleaded that element in the indictment.I7' The trial court disagreed 
and defined sub-section (2) as a sentencing factor. Since the judge found 
serious bodily injury by a preponderance of the evidence, the twenty-five 
year sentence was proper.I7' The defendant appealed to the Ninth Circuit, 
which agreed with the lower court and found that the serious bodily injury 
language did not set out an element of the 0ffen~e.I'~ The defendant then 
17' See id. at 229. During the hold up, one of Jones' co-felons stuck his gun in the victim's ear 
and then struck him on the head with the weapon. See id. 
172 18 U.S.C. 6 21 19 (1988). 
. , 
'73 Jones, 526 U.S. at 231. The pre-sentence report recommended a 25-year sentence because 
one of the victims had suffered serious bodily injury. The victim suffered a perforated eardrum, as well 
as permanent hearing loss. Id. 
174 See id. 
17' See id. at 231. In addition, Jones was given a consecutive 5-year sentence for the firearm of- 
fense. Id. 
"la See United States v. Oliver, 60 F.3d 547, 547, 552 (9th Cir. 1995). The Ninth Circuit rea- 
soned that the structure of the statute, particularly the grammatical dependence of the numbered subsec- 
tions on the first paragraph, demonstrated Congress's understanding that the subsections did not com- 
plete the definitions of separate crimes. See id. at 552-53. Additionally, the court relied on specific 
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appealed to the Supreme Court, which granted ~erti0rari.I~~ 
In evaluating whether the trial judge's definition of bodily harm as a 
sentencing factor was proper, Justice Souter, writing for the majority, ar- 
ticulated a loosely constructed two-pronged test.I7' First, Justice Souter 
required the Court to consider the historical treatment of the factual as- 
sessment in question. This request was based on the fair assumption that 
Congress is unlikely to intend any radical departures from past practice 
without malung a point of saying so.'79 Second, Justice Souter required the 
Court must favor Congress' interpretation of a statute when a statute can be 
construed in two ways, one of which is constitutionally permissible and the 
other of which is not, "out of respect for Congress," which is assumed to 
legislate in the light of constitutional  limitation^.'^^ 
The Court concluded that subsection (2) was not merely a sentence en- 
hancement, but set forth additional elements of the offense, which could be 
removed from jury c~nsideration.'~' Subjecting the statute to Justice 
Souter's test, the majority first found that historically, Congress had identi- 
fied "serious bodily harm" as an element of an offense in several in- 
stance~.'~' Justice  outer also found support in state legislation, which 
regularly defined "serious bodily injury" as an element of an offense.Ia3 In 
aspects of the statute's legislative history. See id. First, the heading on the subtitle of the bill that 
created the provision was "Enhanced Penalties for Auto Theft," which the court viewed as meaning the 
statute's numbered sections merely defined sentencing enhancements. See id. Second, the court noted 
several references in the Committee Reports and floor debate on the bill to enhanced penalties for an 
apparently single carjacking offense. Id. 
177 Jones v. United States, 523 U.S. 227 (1998). 
17'See id. at 234,239-40. 
'79 See id. (stating that "[ilf a given statute is unclear about treating a fact as element or penalty 
aggravator, it makes sense to look at what other statutes have done, on the fair assumption that Con- 
gress is unlikely to intend any radical departures from past practice without making a point of saying 
so"). The opinion noted that the same approach was used in Almendarez-Torres, where the Court 
st~essed the history of recidivism as a sentencing factor. Id. at 235. 
See id. at 239-40. This principle has "for so long been applied by this Court that it is beyond 
debate." Id. at 240. 
18' See id. at 239-40. 
18' See id. at 235; see, e.g., 10 U.S.C. 5 928(bX2) (2000) (assault by a member of the armed 
forces); 18 U.S.C. 1 37(aX1) (violence at international airports); id. $ 1091(a)(Z) (genocide). Cajack- 
ing is like robbery, on which the statute is patterned. Serious bodily injury has traditionally been 
treated as an element of the offense of aggravated robbery. See Jones, 526 U.S. at 235. 
See, e.g., ALA. CODE 13A-8-41(a)(2) (1994) (robbery in the first degree defined in part by 
the causing of "serious physical injury"); ALASKA STAT. 5 11.41.500(a)(3) (Michie 1996) (robbery in 
the first degree defined in part by the causing of "serious physical injury"); ARK. CODE ANN. 5 5-12- 
103 (Michie 1997) (aggravated robbery; "[ilnflicts or attempts to inflict death or serious physical 
injury"); CON. GEN. STAT. !j 53a- 134(aXl) (1994) (robbery in the first degree; "[clauses serious 
physical injury"); IOWA CODE 71 1.2 (1993) (robbery in the first degree; "purposely inflicts or at- 
tempts to inflict serious injury"); KANS. STAT. ANN. § 2 1-3427 (1995) (aggravated robbery; "inflicts 
bodily harm"); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 515.020(1Xa) (Michie 1990) (robbery in the first degree; 
"causes physical injury"); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 636:1(III)(c) (1996) (class A felony of robbery; 
"[ilnflicted or attempted to inflict death or serious injury"); N.Y. PENAL LAW 5 160.15 (McKinney 
1988) (robbery in the first degree; "[c]auses serious physical injury"); ORE. REV. STAT. 5 164.415(1)(c) 
(1990) (robbery in the first degree; "[c]auses or attempts to cause serious physical injury"); TEX. PE- 
Heinonline - -  35 Conn. L. Rev. 1374 2002-2003 

1376 CONNECTICUT LA W RE VIE W [Vol. 35: 135 1 
contradicts the approach the Court followed in the previous term.Ig9 Ac- 
cording to Justice Kennedy, under Almendarez-Torres the Court should 
only consider the issue if the statute is "generally susceptible to two con- 
structions after, and not before, its complexities are ~nraveled."'~~ Here, 
the proper construction is even clearer than in Almendarez-Torrez. For that 
reason, the majority, according to the dissenters, was wrong in its conclu- 
sion. The majority rejected Justice Kennedy's rallying cry and thus Jones 
set the stage for the Court to abolish its practice of deferring wholesale to 
the legislature on issues concerning assigning the burden of proving par- 
ticular elements of a crime. 
If the Jones Court began the retreat from the Patterson-McMillan doc- 
trine of judicial deference to the legislature where defming the elements of 
a crime is concerned, the Court in Apprendi v. New JerseyI9' completed the 
withdrawal. In Apprendi, the defendant pled guilty to possession of a fire- 
arm for unlawfbl purpose and unlawful possession of a prohibited weapon 
and was sentenced to an extended term under New Jersey's hate crime 
statute The statute under which the defendant was convicted provided 
that possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose was punishable by 
imprisonment for "between five years and ten years."'93 A separate "hate 
crime" law provided for an increased imprisonment if the trial judge found, 
"by a preponderance of the evidence, that 'the defendant in committing the 
crime acted with a purpose to intimidate an individual or group of indi- 
viduals because of race, color, gender, handicap, religion, sexual orienta- 
tion or ethni~ity.'"'~~ The hate crime law authorized that an extended term 
for second-degree offenses is imprisonment for "between 10 and 20 
years."Ig5 The defendant was convicted and sentenced under both the 
predicate statute and the hate crime law.196 He appealed to the Superior 
Ig9 See id. at 266. Once again, Justice Kennedy stressed that the constitutional doubt methodol- 
ogy is incorrect in light of Almendorez-Torres. Id. 
190 Id. (quoting Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 238). Kennedy noted the Court found insuffi- 
cient ambiguity to warrant the use of the constitutional doubt principle in Almendarez-Torres. See id. 
19' 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
. . 
'92 Id. at 470-71. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the prosecutor dismissed 20 other counts 
against Apprendi. Id. 
'93 See id. at 468 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. 4 2C:43-6(a)(2) (West 1995)). 
194 Id. at 468-69 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. 4 2C:44-3(e) (West Supp.2000)). 
19' .- - Id. at 469 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN 4 2C:43-7(a)(3)). 
I Y 6  Id. at 471. As part of the plea agreement the state resewed the right to request the court to 
impose a higher "enhanced" sentence on the ground the offense was committed with a biased purpose. 
Id. at 470-471. At the same time, Apprendi reserved the right to challenge the hate crime sentence 
enhancement on the ground that it violates the U.S. Constitution. Id. After the trial judge accepted the 
three guilty pleas, the prosecutor filed a formal motion for the extended term. Id. The hial judge then 
held an evidentiary hearing to determine Apprendi's purpose for the shooting. Id. Based on the evi- 
dence presented, the judge found the crime motivated by racial bias, "with a purpose to intimidate" as 
provided by the statute. Id. Thus, the hate crime enhancement applied. The judge also rejected Ap- 
prendi's Constitutional challenge. Id. 
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Court, Appellate Division, which, relying on McMillan, affirmed the lower 
court r~ling. '~ '  The defendant then appealed to the New Jersey Supreme 
Court, which affirmed the deci~ion.'~' On appeal, the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari. lg9 
The Court considered whether the "hate crime" sentence enhancements 
as defined by the New Jersey legislature was constitutional under the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth The Apprendi Court, 
following the decision in Jones, concluded that it would look to the statute 
at issue, rather than its prior practice of deferring to the legislature and its 
label of "hate crime" as a sentence enhan~ernent.'~' In evaluating the stat- 
ute, the Court considered the effect that the legislative label has on pun- 
ishment, the historical background for defining sentencing factors, and the 
potential for legislative abuseS2O2 
The Court found that under the New Jersey scheme, the judicial find- 
ing by a preponderance of the evidence exposed the defendant to a greater 
punishment than that authorized by the jury's verdictzo3 The Court noted 
that, historically, it interpreted the Due Process Clause to "demand . . . a 
19' State v. Apprendi, 698 A.2d 1265, 1271 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997); see also McMillan 
v. Pennsylvania. 477 U.S. 79 (1986). The court found the state legislature decided to make the hate 
crime enhancement a "sentencing factor" rather than an element of the offense. The court characterized 
the required finding as one of "motive" and not an element of the offense unless the legislature so 
arovides. Aoorendi. 698 A.2d at 1270. . . 
19' State v. Apprendi. 731 A.2d 485,497 (N.J. 1999). The court explained the due process only 
requires the State to prove the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The court stated: 
merely because the legislature has placed the hatecrime enhance within the sentenc- 
ing provisions of the Code of Criminal Justice does not mean that the finding of a bi- 
ased purpose to intimidate is not an essential element of the offense Were that the 
case, the Legislature could just as easily allow judges, not juries to determine if a 
kidnapping victim has been released unharmed. 
Id. at 492. 
The court then undertook an inquiry, looking at many factors, to determine the hate crime provi- 
sion was valid. The statute, in the court's view, did not create a separate offense calling for separate 
penalties, but rather, the legislature simply took one factor that has always been considered by sentenc- 
ing courts to bear on punishment and dictated the weight to be given that factor. Id, at 493-96. 
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 528 U.S. 101 8 (1999). 
'* Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466,468-69 (2000) (considering "whether the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that a factual determination authorizing an increase in 
the maximum prison sentence for an offense from 10 to 20 years be made by a jury on the basis of 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt"). 
20' Id. at 476 (stating that their "answer . . . was foreshadowed by [their] opinion in Jones v. 
United Stotes . . . . [tlhe Fourteenth Amendment commands the same answer in this case involving a 
state statute"). The Court also noted the "relevant inquiry is not one of form, but of effect-does the 
required finding expose the defendant to a greater punishment than that authorized by the jury's guilty 
verdict?" Id. at 494. 
'02 Id. at 476-90. The Court summarized that "our reexamination of our cases in this area, and of 
the history upon which they rely, confirms the opinion we expressed in Jones." Id. at 490. 
'03 Id. at 491. For this reason, the Court held the practice under the New Jersey statute "could not 
stand." See id. at 490-91. 
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higher degree of persuasion" in order to successhlly prosecute a crime.204 
Here, the New Jersey legislature threatened "certain pains" for unlawfully 
possessing a weapon and additional pains for intimidating his victims 
based on race.'05 The Court found that, "as a matter of simple justice . . . 
the procedural safeguards designed to protect [the defendant] from unwar- 
ranted pains should apply equally to the two acts that New Jersey has sin- 
gled out for p~nishrnent."~"~ 
The Court also raised concerns that accepting the New Jersey legisla- 
ture's definition of a hate-crime as a sentence enhancement ran the risk of 
which the Court warned in M ~ l l a n e ~ ? ~ ~  Specifically, if left to stand, the 
New Jersey legislature would have effectively circumvented the protec- 
tions of Winship merely by "redefining the elements that constitute differ- 
ent crimes, characterizing them as factors that bear solely on the extent of 
p~nishrnent."~~' 
The Apprendi Court concluded that with the exception of facts regard- 
ing prior convictions, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond 
the proscribed statutory maximum must be submitted to the jury and 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.209 For the first time since Mullaney, the 
Court limited the legislature's ability to assign the burden of proof by la- 
beling an element of a crime as a sentence enhancement. Moreover, fol- 
lowing Apprendi, courts would no longer have to pay great judicial defer- 
ence to legislative decisions. Instead, they could conduct their own analy- 
sis, as to whether a legislative label of a particular element ran afoul of the 
due process rights of the C~nstitution."~ 
Justice O'Connor's dissent was critical of the majority's decision to 
"cast aside" the Court's prior practice of deferring to the legislative label- 
ing of elements of a crime.2" She warned that the majority decision would 
require Courts to look into the area of the law that was delegated to the 
legislative Her dissent also criticized the majority for relying too 
'04 Id. at 478 (finding that the degree of persuasion has crystallized into the formula "beyond a 
reasonable doubt"). This rule seems to date back to 1798. See id. 
205 Id. at 476. Thus, merely "using the label 'sentence enhancement"' to describe the latter surely 
does not provide a principled basis for treating them differently. Id. 
z06 Id. 
'07 Id. at 494-95; see also supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text. 
Id. at 485 (quoting Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 698). 
'09 Id. at 490 (confirming the holding in Jones regarding prior convictions). 
210 Id. 
21 1 Id. at 525 (O'Connor, J . ,  dissenting). Justice O'Connor felt the majority had rejected the 
Court's traditional cautious approach, in exchange for a new bright line rule. Id. 
Id. at 550-51 (O*Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor felt the most "significant impact" 
of the majority's decision would be the effect it may have on sentencing conducted under the federal 
and state determinate sentencing guidelines. Id. Since she felt the Court deemed such guidelines 
unconstitutional, many people currently serving sentences under those guidelines would "flood" the 
courts seeking to invalidate their sentences. Id. at 551. This could equal up to one half million cases. 
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heavily on Mullaney in its analysis and decision and disregarding the post- 
Mullaney and McMillan decisions, which had created mounting precedent 
in favor of legislative deferral on matters of assigning burdens of proof.213 
Justice Breyer, in a separate dissent, charged that the new Apprendi rule 
created a "procedural ideal" that juries would be the sole determiners of the 
existence of facts upon which punishment Indeed, the weight of 
Breyer's criticism was aimed at the likely effect of the Apprendi decision, 
in returning to the jury the role of deciding beyond a reasonable doubt 
those facts for which the defendant will be punished. 
Justice O'Connor, in her dissent, criticized both the majority and Jus- 
tice Thomas' concurrence for their "expansive readingw2" of ~ u l l a n e ~ . ~ ' ~  
According to the dissent, the Apprendi ruling has the potential to overrule 
P~tterson.2'~ Justice O'Connor wrote that in Patterson, the defendant's 
failure to prove extreme emotional disturbance would result in a conviction 
of murder.218 The penalty for murder in New York State far exceeds that of 
rnan~laughter.~~~ Consequently, extreme emotional disturbance could be 
considered a "fact" that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the statu- 
tory maximum and, therefore, must be submitted to the jury and proven 
beyond a reasonable 
Apprendi illustrates the Court's retrenchment from its view that the 
legislature is the dispositive authority on which statutory language requires 
proof beyond a reasonable do~bt.2~'  The decision marks a retreat from the 
litany of cases, beginning with Patterson, which upheld the judicial princi- 
Id. Also, she noted the decision leaves state and federal judges in limbo when it comes to sentencing. 
See id. at 51. 
Id. at 529-30 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor argued that the Court ignored the 
Patterson case, which rejected an extensive reading of Mullaney. Id. at 530. Also, the same reasoning 
was conducted in Jones and Almendarez-Torres. See id. at 532. 
214 Id. at 555 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Breyer noted this ideal cannot work in the "real world of 
criminal justice." Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). In addition, Justice Scalia, in a very briefconcurrence, 
spent all his time the criticizing the Breyer dissent. See id. at 498-99 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
Id. at 531 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
216 See id. (O'Connor, J. dissenting). 
217 Id. at 531 (O'Connor, J. dissenting). 
Id. (OIConnor, J., dissenting). 
See N.Y. PENAL LAW 8 125.15 (West 1998) (stating that "[m]anslaughter . . . is a Class C fel- 
ony"); N.Y. PENAL LAW 8 125.25 (West 1998) (stating that "[mlurder . . . is a Class A-l felony"); N.Y. 
PENAL LAW 8 70.00 (West 1998) (enumerating that sentence of imprisonment for a Class A felony 
"shall be life imprisonment" and that the term for a Class C felony "shall not exceed fifteen years"). 
220 Appredi, 530 U.S. at 531 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
Compare In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,364 (1969) (finding that "[llest there remain any doubt 
about the constitutional stature of the reasonable-doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the Due Proc- 
ess Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of 
every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged"), with Pattmon v. New York, 
432 U.S. 197,207 (1977) (rejecting the proposition "that a State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
every fact, the existence or nonexistence of which it is willing to recognize as an exculpatory or miti- 
gating circumstance affecting the degree of culpability or the severity of the punishment"). 
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ple that courts should pay great deference to legislatures in matters con- 
cerning their definitions of crimes.222 The Court's renewed commitment to 
evaluate for itself whether a legislature's definition of a crime is appropri- 
ate sounds a call to return to the pre-Patterson days of Winship and Mul- 
laney. 
111. DEFINING A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS 
A. A Critical Review of the Post-Winship Cases 
It was well understood prior to Winship and Mullaney that, as a general 
matter, the language in a pamcular criminal statute defined the corpus of a 
crime.223 Following Patterson, however, legislatures could include in their 
statutes language that seemingly defined the crime, but which was exempt 
from the requirements of Winship, if it was labeled as a sentence enhance- 
ment or an affirmative defense. For the years beginning with Patterson 
and through Almendarez-Torres, legislatures had great discretion to label 
elements of a statute as they saw fit. It was not until the Jones and Ap- 
prendi cases that the Court tightened the reigns on legislatures. In these 
cases the Court found, similar to Mullaney, that, at least where sentence 
enhancements are concerned, the presumption in a particular statute favors 
interpreting its language to be comprised of "every fact necessary to con- 
stitute the crime with which [the defendant] is charged."224 Indeed, the 
Apprendi decision marks a clear return to the principles of Mullaney, at 
least where sentence enhancements are concerned. 
The Apprendi ruling does not make clear, however, how it portends for 
those cases concerning affirmative defenses.22' Read literally, Apprendi 
only limits a court's review of sentence enhancements. Many critics, how- 
ever, suggest that a liberal reading of Apprendi could close the door on the 
legislature's ability to shift the burden of proving affirmative defenses to 
the defendant.226 Should the Court extend its ruling, it would clearly mark 
222 See McMillan discussion, supra notes 101-06 and accompanying text; see also Harmelin v. 
Michigan 501 U.S. 957, 961, 996 (1991) (upholding a mandatory life sentence for possession of co- 
caine against an Eight Amendment challenge). Justice Kennedy concluded in a separate opinion that 
fixing prison terms "is properly within the province of legislatures not courts." Id. at 998 (Kennedy, J., 
concuning in part and concuning in the judgment) (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263,275-76 
(1980 ) '" See WAYNE R LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 8 (3d ed. West 2000). 
224 
--- Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 477 (quoting Winshi' 397 U.S. at 364). 
LL3 The Mullaney-Jones-Apprendi litany grew out of decisions that considered the constitutional- 
ity of affirmative defenses. See cases in@ Part 11. 
226 See King & Klein, supra note 24, at 1481-82. Others argue that while the Apprendi issue re- 
sembles the controversy over "affirmative defenses", the legislature's likely greater willingness to push 
the outer limits of the formalistic approach set forth in Apprendi will result in a failure to provide the 
controversy necessary to review such a case. See also Joseph L. Hoffrnann, Apprendi v .  New Jersey: 
Back to rhe Future?, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 255,279-80 (2001); Sundby, supra note 24, at 46 (identify- 
ing three main schools of thought on the scope of the reasonable doubt rule). 
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a return to Mullaney, prohibiting legislatures from defining an affirmative 
defense in such a way that excludes it from jury c~nsideration.~~' 
Expansive proceduralists argue that under Apprendi there is sound rea- 
soning for a return to Mullaney. According to this school of thought, the 
reasonable doubt rule attaches to every fact affecting the defendant's 
criminal liability.228 In his article, The Reasonable Doubt Rule and the 
Meaning of Innocence, Professor Sundby wrote that Mullaney represented 
the closest that the Supreme Court had come to adopting the expansive 
proceduralists' view.229 "By evincing willingness to look beyond the 
state's designation of who bore the burden of persuasion, the Court has 
raised a 'Mullaney question' regarding any factor significantly affecting 
the defendant's conviction and punishment."230 Justice O'Connor's dissent 
in Apprendi supports Professor Sundby's conclusion by noting that the 
case concerned "the distinct question of when a fact that bears on a defen- 
dant's punishment, but which the legislature has.not classified as an ele- 
ment of the charged offense, must nevertheless be treated as an offense 
element."23' 
The Apprendi decision provides the Court with an opportunity to over- 
rule Patterson and to return to Mullaney, thereby prohibiting legislatures to 
reallocate the burden of proving affirmative defenses.232 However, such a 
suggestion begs the question of whether, twenty-five years after the Mul- 
laney decision, it would be appropriate for the Court to so do. Moreover, 
given the decisions following Mullaney through Apprendi, is such a return 
truly consistent with the Court's parameters of the Due Process Clause? 
B. The Mullaney/Jones/Apprendi Construct: A Two-Pronged Test 
The cases taken as a whole provide a nice framework for analyzing 
whether Apprendi should extend to affirmative defenses. In reaching its 
decision, the Apprendi and Jones Courts relied heavily on the same reason- 
227 See King & Klein, supra note 24, at 1481-82. 
Sundby, supra note 24, at 464. In his article, Professor Sundby defines what he terms as two 
strains of proceduralism. Id. Under expansive proceduralism, the court may not distinguish between 
elements, sentence enhancements or affirmative defenses. Id. Indeed, if facts A, B, and C are each part 
of a crime, then the prosecution must prove each of these beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 464. Under 
expansive proceduralism, the reasonable doubt rule attaches to every fact affecting the defendant's 
criminality, including the absence of defenses. Id. at 465. In converse, under restrictive proceduralism, 
the classification of a fact is up to the state, but once classified as an element of the crime, the prosecu- 
tion must prove it beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 471. 
229 Id. at 466. 
230 Id. at 469. 
23 1 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466,527 (2000) (O'Connor J., dissenting). 
232 It is appropriate to rely on cases concerning sentence enhancements to define the law for af- 
firmative defenses because: (1) The court uses same precedent for both; (2) in both instances the issue 
is whether the legislature can permissibly remove proof of an element from jury consideration and; (3) 
they both affect punishment. 
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ing that the majority articulated in M ~ l l a n e y . ~ ~ ~  Unlike the Martin, 
McMillan, or Almanderez-Torres cases, which seemed to defer, almost 
wholesale, to the legislatures, the Apprendi, Jones and Mullaney Courts 
considered certain factors to help themselves and lower courts evaluate the 
permissibility of shifting the burden of proving a non-essential element of a 
crime.234 Read together, Mullaney, Jones, and Apprendi articulate a clear 
two-prong test for hture courts to consider when evaluating whether the 
legislature may permissibly shift the burden of proof in a criminal prosecu- 
tion. 
In almost every post- Winship case, the majority placed significant em- 
phasis on the historical importance of an element when considered in the 
context of the Due Process Clause.235 In Mullaney, Jones, and Apprendi, 
the Court looked to legislative history prior to the Civil War to find support 
for its conclu~ion.~" Mullaney, Justice Powell relied on an in-depth 
historical review of the murderlmanslaughter distinction, concluding that 
the historical distinction dictated the Court's conclusion that the prosecu- 
tion could not shift the burden of proof for heat of passion to the defen- 
dant.u7 In Jones, Justice Souter relied on Congress's unlikely intention to 
radically depart from past practices.238 In Apprendi, Justice Stevens found 
that the Court's "reexamination" of history dictated its ruling that the legis- 
lature may not automatically designate an element of a crime as a sentence 
enhan~ement.')~ The Almendarez-Torres Court relied on the history of 
treating recidivism as a sentencing factor in declaring that a prior convic- 
tion was not an element of a crime."0 
The other common theme among these cases was the concern for po- 
tential legislative abuse.241 In Mullaney, the Court found the potential for 
233 See supra notes I5 and accompanying text. 
U4 See supra Part 11. 
235 See, e.g., supra Part II. 
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 501 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Jones, 526 U.S. at 244-48; Mullaney, 421 
U.S. at 692-96. 
237 See Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 696. See generally HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE 
CRIMMAL SANCTION 136-39 (1968) (discussing the standard of proof in criminal cases); George P. 
Fletcher, Two Kinds of Legal Rules: A Comparative Study of Buden of Persuasion Practices in Crimi- 
nal Coses, 77 YALE L.J. 880, 903-07 (1968) (analyzing the development of burden-of-proof rules for 
criminal defenses). 
238 Jones, 526 U.S. at 234 (pointing out that statutes must be viewed with the "fair assumption 
that Congress is unlikely to intend any radical departures from past practice without making a point of 
sayin so"). 
' Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490. Note that in his dissent in Martin, Justice Powell said we must 
look to the historical importance of the element when considering whether it is a fact necessary to prove 
the crime. Martin, 480 U.S. at 242 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
240 Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 243-44. 
24 1 See Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 73840 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (alerting the 
Court to the slippery slope of legislative denial of defendants' constitutional protections through the 
creation of Constitution-eluding sentence enhancements). 
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future legislative abuse as support for its decision.242 In Jones, the Court 
expressed concern that "recognizing an unlimited legslative power to au- 
thorize determinations setting ultimate sentencing limits without a jury 
would invite erosion of the jury's function to a point against which a line 
must necessarily be drawn."243 The Apprendi Court seemed to reach its 
conclusion in part to curtail the legislative abuse that had grown out of the 
post-Mullaney decisions. 
The Mullaney/Apprendi/Jones construct clearly articulates a two- 
pronged test for evaluating the legislature's ability to define "factors that 
bear solely on the extent of puni~hment."~" Specifically, courts must con- 
sider two questions: (1) do the historic principles of punishment demand 
that the burden of proof remain with the prosecution? And (2) does allow- 
ing the legislature to allocate the burden of proof pose the risk of permit- 
ting it to impermissibly overstep its boundaries? 
1. The Historic Principles of Punishing the Conduct in Question 
a. The Historic Principles of Defining Affirmative Defenses for 
the Purposes of Punishment 
Assigning the burden of proving affirmative defenses to the defendant 
is well rooted in early common law. As early as the 1300s, prosecutors 
were charged with proving the defendant's criminal act beyond a reason- 
able AS a result, the defendant could not call witnesses or hire an 
attorney.246 A defendant could only present evidence of a defense to the 
King after conviction, as a means to mitigate punish~nent.~~' 
The crimes for which one could be charged during this time were lim- 
ited in number and in scope.248 Similarly, these crimes were traditionally 
punished by death or great bodily harm.249 Because of the severe punish- 
242 Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 698-99 (pointing out that a state could undermine the safeguards of due 
process by recharacterizing substantive elements of a crime as factors that relate to the punishment of 
the crime). 
243 Jones, 526 U.S. at 244. 
2" Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 698. 
245 THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNET?, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 438 (Little, Brown 
& Co. 5th ed. 1956) (1929). 
246 Id. The theory behind such a rule was that if the Crown proved its case, that was the end of 
the matter. Id. On the other hand, if it did not, that failure would be apparent in spite of the silent 
defense. Id. Thus, the need to call witnesses or hire an attorney were "superfluous." Id. 
247 See id. at 445. For examule. in case-s of homicides involvina self-defense or misadventure. 
. . - 
248 Id. at 442-51. The felonies included treason, murder, manslaughter, larceny, receiving stolen 
goods and attempt crimes. Many other crimes fit into the common law felony category. For example, 
blackmailing became a constructive robbery felony, before it was made expressly criminal by statute in 
1722. Id. at 451. 
249 J. M. BEATTIE, CRIME AND THE COURTS M ENGLAND 1660-1800, at 451 (Princeton Univ. 
Press 1986). For example, in the 1660s those convicted of treason were given punishment aimed at 
inflicting the maximum of pain and ignominy. Id. The convict was to be hanged, cut down while still 
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ment, defendants were usually successful in their presentation of defenses 
on appeal to the King and were generally awarded a criminal pardon.250 
The rise in pardons in the late 1300s led the House of Commons to adopt a 
statute calling for a general limit on the issuance of  pardon^.^" Conse- 
quently, defendants were limited in their venues in which to argue their 
justification or excuse for committing a particular crime.252 
In the early eighteenth century, defendants first were permitted to call 
witnesses in their defense at triaLzS3 Those charged under the Church's 
criminal justice system assumed the burden of proving their innocence.254 
The prosecution at such trials assumed a passive role.255 Although this 
seemed unduly harsh, the defendant's burden necessitated the presentation 
of a defense on his behalf.256 These trials generally consisted of the de- 
fense merely presenting evidence of an excuse, justification, or wrongful 
prosecution. 
Non-secular judicial tribunals rejected the canonical system of allocat- 
ing the burden of proof to the defendant in favor of retaining the judicial 
safeguards inherent in proof by the Viscount Snakey L.C. 
best articulated this principle, stating "[t]hroughout the web of English 
criminal law one golden thread is always to be seen, that it is the duty of 
the prosecution to prove the prisoner's guilt subject to . . . the defense of 
insanity."258 This common law principle of our Due Process Clause, how- 
ever, did not prohibit the judge from shifting the burden of proving certain 
alive, disemboweled and castrated, beheaded and quartered. Id. Also, convictions for rape were often 
punished by mutilation. PLUCKNETT, supra note 245, at 451. 
250 PLUCKNETT, supro note 245, at 445 (noting that "the prerogative of mercy was the only point 
at which . . . medieval criminal law was at all flexible"). The liberality with which pardons were 
granted gradually lead to the classification of different levels of homicide. Id. 
251 Id. at 445-46. An earlier statute started this movement in 1328. Id. at 445. The Act called for 
restraint in issuing pardons due to the ease with which such pardons were granted. Id. 
252 Id. at 446. The 1390 statute recognized certain pardons as issuing from Chancery as a matter 
of course, in cases such & self-defense or misadventure. Id. The statute contrasted pardons for mur- 
ders done in "in await, assault, or malice prepcnse." Id. In these types of cases pardons were almost 
impossible to secure. Id. 
253 Id. at 438. 
254 Id. This was known as the canonical system, and was applied to eighteenth century clergy and 
to laymen who had been tried under the Church's criminal jurisdiction. 
255 Id. In fact, the prosecution could call no witnesses. Id. This led to a rise in acquittals. Id. 
The procedure basically involved an exculpatory oath by the accused, twelve compurgator oaths, evi- 
dence of the accused, and a jury verdict. Id. at n.2. 
256 Basically, the accused had to prove his innocence. Id. The assumption was made that if the 
accused was innocent he ought to be able to demonstrate it for the ju~y. Id. Thus, the accused took on 
an active role. Id. The idea that the accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty did not become 
an active principle until about 1820. BEATTIE, supra note 249, at 341. 
257 GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL AW 882-88 (2d ed. 1961). 
Woolmington v. Director of Public Prosecutions, 1935 A.C. 462,481 (1935). 
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defenses to the defendant.259 The English Common Law permitted the de- 
fendant to present proof of the defense of mistake, intoxication, duress, 
necessity, and self-defense.260 
Proof of these defenses remained with the defendant as America de- 
veloped its own body of law. Indeed, the American Law Institute codified 
each defense in the Model Penal Code ("MPC").Z6' Most of these defenses 
appear separate fiom the substantive crimes defined later in the MPC. For 
example, MPC 2.04 provides that the defendant has a mistake of fact or 
law defense to a substantive crime upon proof of certain ~onditions!~~ 
However, in some instances, the defense is defined within the context of 
the statute.263 MPC 210.3 Manslaughter provides that a homicide, which 
would otherwise be murder, is manslaughter if committed under the influ- 
ence of extreme emotional di~turbance.2~~ The MPC is inconsistent, how- 
ever, concerning allocation of burden of proof. MPC 2.04(3) clearly allo- 
cates the burden of proof to the defendant by a preponderance of the evi- 
dence, where as MPC 210.0 is silent regarding which bears the burden of 
proving that the defendant acted under extreme emotional disturbance.265 
As a general matter, legislatures and courts have failed to define or 
create affirmative defenses in the past century. With the exception of the 
defense of extreme emotional disturbance, which is really just an expan- 
259 WILLIAMS, supra note 257, at 885. This idea, that the burden shifts to the defendant to make 
out defenses, was not confined to homicide charges, but rather was of general application in all charges 
under the criminal law. Id. 
260 SIR JAMES FITZ~AMES STEPHEN, A DIGEST OF THE CRJMMAL AW 15-21 (McMillan & Co. 
1877) (providing examples of actual statutes providing for such defenses, as well as others such as age 
and insanity); see also WILLIAMS, supra note 257, at 885 (stating that "it is the duty of the prosecution 
to prove the prisoner's guilt, subject to . . . the defence of insanity and subject to any statutory excep- 
tion.") (internal citations omitxed). 
''I Section 2.04 of the ~ o d e l  Penal Code ("MPC") defines the "Ignorance or Mistake" defense. 
It expressly requires a defendant prove the defense by a preponderance of the evidence. The Intoxica- 
tion defense is provided for in 2.08, and Duress is explained in 2.09. Neither section expressly assigns 
the burden of proof. Likewise, necessity (3.02) and selfdefense (3.04) also assign no express burden 
of proof. MODEL PENAL CODE $4 2.04,2.08,2.09,3.02,3.04 (Official Draft 1962). 
262 MODEL PENAL CODE 6 2.04 (Official Draft 19621 
See id. The defense is only available if the ignorance or mistake negatives the mental re- 
quirement required to establish a material element of the offense or if the law provides that the state of 
mind established by such ignorance or mistake constitutes a defense. Id. 
264 The statute reads: 
(1 ) Criminal Homicide constitutes manslaughter when: 
(a) it is committed recklessly; or 
(b) a homicide which would otherwise be murder is committed under the influence 
of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is a reasonable ex- 
planation or excuse. The reasonableness of such explanation or excuse shall be 
determined from the viewpoint of a person in the actor's situation under the cir- 
cumstances as he believes them to be. 
(2) Manslaughter is a felony of the second degree. 
Id. 6 210.3. 
" 265 Interestingly, the statute at issue in the Patterson case, N.Y. PENAL LAW 5 125.25, is pat- 
terned upon § 210.3 of the Model Penal Code. See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
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sion of the common-law heat of passion defense, and the defense of en- 
trapment, virtually all the defenses codified by legislatures existed at com- 
mon law.2M For the most part, therefore, the notion of affirmative defenses 
and their definitions are a reflection of the American judicial system, as it 
existed over 200 years ago. 
b.   he' Historic Principles of Punishing Conduct Defined as 
Sentence Enhancements 
In contrast to affirmative defenses, sentence enhancements are a crea- 
ture of the modem legislat~re.~" American criminal law, while based on 
common law crimes, is now predominately statutory. Over the past two 
centuries, legislatures have embraced their authority to define criminal 
conduct.268 As a general rule, legislatures define substantive crimes 
broadly in terms of the act and intent elements, typically defining the ap- 
propriate level of punishment for the broad categories of crimes' in a sepa- 
rate part of the criminal code.269 
While the trend leaned towards defining crimes generally, some legis- 
latures included specific attendant circumstances in the traditional common 
law crimes, proof of which resulted in a greater puni~hment.~'~ Originally 
the prosecution was required to prove these attendant circumstances be- 
266 See STEPHEN, supra note 260, at 15-21. Stephen's work, written in 1877, shows the preva- 
lence of aftirmative defenses at that point in time. See id. The author describes in detail, and provides 
statutory examples of, the defenses contained in the MODEL PENAL CODE, including insanity, drunken- 
ness, compulsion, ignorance of law, and ignorance of fact (mistake). See id. 
267 KATE STITH & JOSE A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING 9-38 (University of Chicago Press 
1998). Like affirmative defenses, sentencing was historically not reviewable (discussing the history of 
sentencing in the United States) there were no sentence enhancements at common law.). See Stephanos 
Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence Enhancements in a World ojGuilt ,  110 YALE L.J. 1097, 
1124 (2001). 
STITH & CABRANES. suora note 267. at 22-23. 
, . 
269 For example, the New York State Penal Code Part Two-Sentences, contains Article 55, 
"Classification and Designation of Offenses," N.Y. PENAL LAW $ 55.00 (McKinney 1998). There, $ 
55.05, "Classification of felonies and misdemeanors," provides that "Felonies are classified, for the 
purpose of sentence, into five categories," classes A, B, C, D, and E. Likewise, this section classifies 
misdemeanors as classes A, B, or unclassified. N.Y. PENAL LAW 4 55.05 (McKinney 1998). Article 
60, "Authorized Dispositions of Offenders" and Article 70, "Imprisonment," then proscribe the pun- 
ishment for each classification of felony or misdemeanor. N.Y. PENAL LAW $$ 60.00, 70.00 (McKin- 
ney 1998). For example, $ 70.00, "Sentence of imprisonment for felony," sets the maximum term of 
sentence and minimum period of imprisonment for each class of felony. N.Y. PENAL LAW $ 70.00 
(McKinney 1998). $ 55.10 then provides that for felonies, "the particular classification or subclassifi- 
cation of each felony defined in this chapter is expressly designated in the section or article defining it." 
For misdemeanors, "each misdemeanor defined in this chapter is either a class A misdemeanor or class 
B misdemeanor, as expressly designated in the section or article defining it. N.Y. PENAL LAW $ 55.10 
(McKinney 1998). For example, $ 140.15, Criminal trespass in the second degree, provides that "[a] 
person is guilty of criminal trespass in the second degree when he knowingly enters or remains unlaw- 
fully in a dwelling," and states that "[clriminal trespass in the second degree is a class A misde- 
meanor." Do you also want to put in federal sentencing guidelines? At the federal level, the federal 
sentencing guidelines are also separate from the federal criminal code. 
270 Attendant circumstances are those conditions that must be present, in conjunction with the 
prohibited conduct or result in order to constitute the crime. 
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yond a reasonable doubt since they were part of the broader substantive 
crime.2" However, following Winship, legislatures began to define ele- 
ments in terms of "facts necessary to prove the commission of a crime," 
and those that merely elevate or mitigate punishment.272 
The notion of an increased sentence in certain circumstances absent 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt existed in the early 1900s. When legisla- 
tures began to include additional requirements to a crime, the proof of 
which would result in a higher sentence. Instead of attendant circum- 
stances however, the factors had no substantive relationship to a particular 
crime. The forerunners of sentencing factors or sentence enhancements 
were statute provisions generally targeted at habitual offenders.273 These 
27' For example, New York Penal Code, !j 140.20 defines burglary in the third degree as know- 
ingly entering or remaining in a building with intent to commit a crime therein, and labels it a class D 
felony, which under 5 70.00 carries a punishment fixed by the court but which cannot exceed seven 
years. NEW YORK PENAL LAW $4 140.20,70.00 (McKinney 1998). 4 140.25, burglary in the second 
degree, begins with the same exact definition, but includes the attendant circumstances of either being 
armed with explosives or a deadly weapon, causing physical injury to a non participant in the crime, 
using or threatening use of the dangerous instrument, displaying what appears to be a firearm, or the 
building being a dwelling. NEW YORK PENAL LAW 8 140.25 (McKinney 1998). The additional ele- 
ment raises the level of the crime up to a class C felony, which under 70.00 is also fixed by the court, 
but carries a prison term of up to fifteen years. NEW YORK PENAL LAW 4 70.00 (McKinney 1998). 
272 See N.J. Rev. Stat. 2C:l-13 (2003) (defining which language of a criminal statute requires 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt and which language does not require such proof); Ariz. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. 5 13-3601(L) (2003) (defining sentence enhancements for certain offenses against a pregnant 
victim); Cal. Penal Code 4 452.1 (2003) (defining sentence enhancements for aggravated arson); Mo. 
Rev. Stat. 4 578.425(2) (2003) (permitting sentence enhancement for criminal conduct by gang mem- 
bers "committed on the grounds of, or within one thousand feet of a public or private elementary, 
vocational, junior high or high school . . . ."); see also Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 486 
(2000) (stating that "constitutional limits exist to States' authority to define away facts necessary to 
constitute a criminal offense. . . ."). 
273 , 
,In the early 1900s, sentence enhancements in state penal codes were based on the defendant 
being a habitual criminal. The 1915 Missouri case of State v. Collins discussed the state's habitual 
criminal act. 180 S.W. 866, 867 (Mo. 1915). This case upheld an earlier decision which held that the 
section of a state statute "prescribing greater punishment for a second offense than for the first is not 
unconstitutional, either upon the ground of putting a person twice in jeopardy or prescribing different 
punishments for different persons committing the same offense." Collins, 180 S.W. at 867; see also 
State v. Moore, 26 S.W. 345 (Ma. 1894). A similar state statute was discussed in the 1920 Connecticut 
case of State v Riley. 110 A. 550 (Conn. 1920). It dealt with Connecticut's Indeterminate Sentencing 
Act (CONN. GEN. STAT. 1918, §6660), which provided that "in the case of one or two prior convictions 
the penalty for the new offense on which the defendant is tried and convicted may be made severer than 
when there is no prior conviction." Riley, 110 A. at 551. The court held that prior convictions in an- 
other jurisdiction can be used to enable it to apply the statute, which provided that "when any person so 
sentenced shall have twice before been convicted, sentenced and imprisoned in a state prison or peni- 
tentiary, the court shall sentence said person to a maximum of thirty years." Id. at 552. As precedent 
for its decision, the court cited decisions upholding similar provisions in New York, Massachusetts, and 
West Virginia. Id. at 552-53. All three cases recognized that "the punishment is for the new crime 
only, but is the heavier if [the defendant] is an habitual criminal. The allegation of previous convic- 
tions is not a distinct charge of crime, but is necessary to bring the case within the statute, and goes to 
punishment only." Id. at 552. This principle was affirmed in federal court in the 1934 case of Good- 
man v Kunkle which in analyzing the Indiana Habitual Criminal Statute, holds that "habitual criminality 
is a state, not a crime." 72 F.2d 334,336 (7th Cir. 1934). Moreover, "[hlabitual criminal statutes, such 
as that of Indiana, do not create or define a new independent crime, but they prescribe circumstances 
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provisions were written by legislatures in an effort to provide additional 
specific and general deterrence to repeat criminals.274 
In addition to using sentence enhancements as a means to punish ha- 
bitual criminals, in the early 1900s legislatures began proscribing sentence 
enhancements where a certain factor existed on top of a base crime.275 
These specific elements of the crime were indistinguishable from attendant 
circumstances. Unlike attendant circumstances, however, the legislature 
maintained that these discrete elements did not make up the corpus of the 
crime and therefore, the requirements of the Due Process Clause did not 
attach. For example, in 1935 the California State Legislature amended its 
penal code to increase the punishment for kidnapping in instances where 
the victim suffered harm. In People v. Tanner, 276 the defendant challenged 
the amendment, which only required proof of harm after the jury convicted 
the defendant on the underlying crime.277 The California Supreme Court 
agreed with the legislature's assessment of "harm to the victim" as a sen- 
tence enhancement and upheld the statute as permissible and appropriate 
pursuant to the state's principles of punishment.278 
wherein one found guilty of a specific crime may be more severely penalized because of his previous 
criminalities as thev are alleged and found." Id. - 
274 See Collins, 180 S.W. at 867 (finding that "in case of a second conviction, the penalty shall be 
severer because by the defendant's persistence in the perpetration of crime he has evinced a depravity, 
which merits a greater punishment"). Early habitual offender statutes, which allowed for an increased 
punishment for an individual who had been previously convicted of the same crime, were challenged as 
violative of the Fifth Amendment prohibition against Double Jeopardy. See id. In Collins, the defen- 
dant challenged the Missouri habitual offender statute R.S. 1909, 84913, which provided that "in case 
of a second conviction the penalty shall be severer." Id. at 866. The court upheld the statute holding 
that a defendant's repeat defense evinces a depravity, which merits a greater punishment. Id. at 868. 
Some states created enhancements for a second conviction for a specific crime. In State v. 
McClay, 78 A.2d 347 (1951), the Maine Supreme Court considered a challenge to a statute that pro- 
vided both the substantive offense and the sentence enhancement in the same statute. That statute 
provided that: 
Whoever shall operate or attempt to operate a motor vehicle . . . when intoxicated . . 
. upon conviction shall be punished by a fine of not less than $100, nor more than 
$1000, or by imprisonment for not less than 30 days, nor more than 1 l months, or by 
both such fine and imprisonment. Any person convicted of a 2nd or subsequent of- 
fense shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than 3 or more than I I months, 
and in addition thereto, the court may impose a fine as above provided. 
Id. at 349. 
The court held that the increased fine was a permissible sentence enhancement because "for a first 
offense the court may impose a lesser punishment than it must impose for a second or subsequent 
offense." Id. 
275 See Peoole v. Tanner. 44 P.2d 324.330 (Cal. 1935). 
. . 
276 44 P.2d 324 (Cal. 1935). 
277 Id. at 331. 
278 Id. (claiming that the Supreme Court upheld the validity of an amendment to the state kidnap- 
ping law that increased a defendant's punishment if the kidnap victim suffered harm). There, "[aln Act 
to Amend Section 209 of the Penal Code relating to the punishment of kidnapping," provided that upon 
conviction of kidnapping a defendant "shall suffer death or shall be punished by imprisonment for life 
without possibility of parole, at the discretion of the jury trying the same, in cases in which the person 
or persons subjected to kidnapping suffers or suffer bodily harm." Id. at 294. If the victim did not 
suffer bodily harm, the punishment was only imprisonment in state prison for life with possibility of 
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Perhaps the most significant proliferation of sentence enhancements 
came in 1984 when Congress adopted the Sentencing Reform Act, other- 
wise known as the Federal Sentencing  guideline^.'^^ "The . . . Guidelines 
supplement congressionally enacted [substantive criminal laws]. Within 
the statutory minimum and maximum set for the offense of conviction, the 
conduct for which a defendant will be punished is determined by the con- 
fluence of factors that the Sentencing Commission has decided are relevant 
as punishment."280 For example, 21 U.S.C. 5 844 provides that no person 
shall possess LSD."' If after conviction of the crime, the prosecution can 
show by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant possessed the 
LSD in prison, his punishment is automatically increased by six months to 
a year.282 The sentencing guidelines permit proof of over four hundred 
sentence enhancements that can contribute to an increased sentence.283 
Sentence enhancements allow legislatures to easily accomplish the 
parole. Id. In this case, the defendant "challenged the procedure and questioned the motives of the 
members of the legislature who were pressing the passage of said amendment." Id. at 297. The court 
rejects this argument, and holds that "the suggestion that it was the result of an aroused public feeling 
against kidnapping is no reason why it should be condemned as invalid. Perhaps every measure 
adopted is the result of a public need or demand." Id. at 297. This is still evident today, as California 
has adopted provisions for enhanced sentences if a defendant intentionally inflicts injury on a pregnant 
woman causing termination of pregnancy, or discharges a firearm from a motor vehicle causing paraly- 
sis. CAL. PENAL CODE 4 12022.9 (West 2002). 
279 The Federal Sentencing Guidelines were promulgated to regulate sentences imposed by fed- 
eral judges. The guidelines sought to promote fairness, certainty and uniformity in sentencing. See 
STITH & CABRANES, supra note 267. THE 1984 Act is most significant, Congress had adopted sentence 
enhancements previous to the act. The 1970 Federal Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and 
Control Act, 21 U.S.C. 3 801 contained a sentence enhancement provision, addressed in the 1974 case 
United States v. Noland. 495 F.2d 529 (5th Cir. 1974). The case approves the procedure which the 
prosecution must follow to establish a defendant's previous conviction for the purpose of an increased 
punishment. Id. at 531. The statute requim that the prosecution provide an information stating "in 
writing the previous convictions to be relied upon" before trial or entry of a guilty plea. Id. Besides the 
familiar repeat offender basis, the Comprehensive Drug Abuse and Control Act contains provisions for 
increased sentences based on aggravating factors, for example if a drug offense occurs near where 
children might be: 
Any person who violates $841(a)(l) or section 856 of this title by distributing, pos- 
sessing with intent to distribute, or manufacturing a controlled substance in or on, or 
within one thousand feet of, the real property comprising a public or private elemen- 
tary, vocational or secondary school or a public or private college, junior college, or 
university, or a playground, or housing facility owned by a public housing authority, 
or within 100 ft of a public or private youth center, public swimming pool, or video 
arcade facility is ... subject to (I)  twice the maximum punishment authorized by 
§841(b) of this title; and (2) at least twice the term of any supervised release author- 
ized by section 841(b) of this title . . . . 
21 U.S.C. 4 860 (2000). 
280 STITH & CABRANES, supra note 267, at 77. 
"' 21 U.S.C. 4 844 (2000). 
282 ST~TH & CABRANBS, supra note 267, at app. D. In calculating a defendant's sentence pursu- 
ant to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, a defendant who is convicted of possessing 20 grams of LSD 
would be guilty of a Level 6 Offense, which cames with it a sentence of 0-6 months. If the defendant 
possessed the LSD in a prison, the Sentencing Guidelines require the Offense Level to be raised to a 
level of 13, which cames with it a 12-1 8 month sentence. Id. 
283 18 U.S.C. 44 3351-59,3561-66,3571-74,3581-86; 28 U.S.C. $5 991-98 (2000). 
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principles of punishment by increasing the duration of one's loss of liberty 
upon proof of a standard that is less than beyond a reasonable doubt. For 
this reason, they are attractive commodities to lawmakers. As legislatures 
began to codify traditional common law crimes in the early 1800s, the use 
of sentence enhancements became an effective way of ensuring legislative 
grading for more serious offenses, not because of the defendant's higher 
intent level, but instead because of an increase in the severity of the result. 
Consequently, in the past half-century there has been a proliferation of 
sentence enhancements. 
Justice Scalia, dissenting in Monge v. California:84 recognized the cur- 
rent trend among legislatures to substitute sentence enhancements for 
criminal convi~tions.~~' Sentence enhancements allow popularly-elected 
legislatures to boast of a quick response to crime in the street, and have 
thus become a speedy means to accomplish the goals of punishment among 
legislatures in this country.286 As a result, Constitution-eluding sentence 
enhancements have, in a sense, become the darling of the legislatures. 
2 .  The Risk of Abuse when a Legislature Is Permitted to Allocate the 
Burden of Proof for a Particular Element 
a. The Risk of the Legislature Abusing its Power when Defining 
Affirmative Defenses 
Most jurisdictions and the Model Penal Code have adopted the 
affirmative defenses that existed at common law.287 Many criminal codes 
include a provision defining the standard of proof for affirmative de- 
f e n s e ~ . ~ ~ ~  Other than the fairly recent trend toward codification of common 
law legislatures have failed to exercise their muscle in a way 
284 397 U.S. 358 (1970). See generally Stephanos Bibas, Article, Judicial Fact-Finding and Sen- 
tence Enhancements in a World ojGuilty Pleas. 110 YALE L.J. 1097 (2001). 
285 Bibas, supra note 284, at 1 1 10-1 1. 
286 See, e.g., Andrew Little, Comment, Caught Red-Handed: The Peculiarities of the Federal 
Schoolyard Statute and Its Interpretation in Be F~j?h Circuit, 31 TEX. TECH L. REV. 245, 273 (2000) 
(noting that "[p]opularly elected legislators are quick to respond to a vocal constituency demanding 
stiffer enalties for drug dealers). 
MODEL P ~ u f i C o o E  (4 2.04,2.08,2.09,3.02,3.04 (Official Dratl 1962). 
288 See, e.g., State v. Delibero, 149 N.J. 90, 99 (App. Div. 1997) (stating that "[tlhe State in a 
criminal prosecution is bound to prove every element of the offense charged beyond a reasonable 
doubt. That burden cannot be shifted to the defendant, even when a defendant is asserting an affirma- 
tive defense."). New Jersey Criminal Code would require the state to disprove this affirmative defense 
beyond a reasonable doubt. See N.J. STAT. ANN. ( 2C:I-13b(2) (West 1995) (declaring that under this 
default provision, where an affirmative defense is silent as to the standard of proof, and there is any 
evidence to support the defense, the prosecution must disprove the affirmative defense beyond a rea- 
sonable doubt). 
289 State v. DeCastro, 913 P.2d 558 (HI App. 1996) (rev'd on other grounds) (calling Hawaii's 
codification of Section 2.04 of the Model Penal Code a recent codification of a common law defense). 
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that would allow the defendant to avail himself of a defense.290 
In limited circumstances, however, legislatures have defined new af- 
firmative defenses for existing traditional common law crimes.29' The 
MPC's adoption of the extreme emotional disturbance defense is the best 
example of a new defense that did not exist at common law.292 Some juris- 
dictions have created an affirmative defense to felony murder upon show- 
ing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant was not indi- 
vidually culpable for the murder.293 The New Jersey Legislature created a 
new affirmative defense of being in a public place in the context of lawful 
conditions that can be imposed upon remaining in a gambling casino.294 
These limited instances whereby legislatures have created new affirmative 
defenses seem to be the exception rather than the rule?95 
The more common trend is to limit rather than to expand the category 
of affirmative defenses. The Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984:% for 
example, significantly limited the insanity defense and completely eradi- 
cated "diminished capacity" and "diminished responsibility" as affirmative 
defen~es.2~~ In Hawaii, a recent attempt to make Extreme Mental or Emo- 
tional Disturbance ("EMED) an affirmative defense, which would have 
required defendants to establish EMED by a preponderance of the evi- 
dence, was vetoed by the governor.298 The absence of a proliferation of 
new affirmative defenses indicates little likelihood for legislative abuse. 
See King & Klein, supra note 24, at 1546. Since the Pauerson case, nine additional states 
have adopted a statute that requires the defendant prove extreme emotional disturbance in order to 
mitigate murder to manslaughter. In total, 12 states have such a statute. 
Donald Baier, Arizona Felony Murder: Let The Punishment Fit The Crime, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 
701, 703-04 (1994). In keeping with recent trends, the Arizona Legislature recently proposed an af- 
firmative defense to felony murder as part of its 1992 Criminal Code Revision Bill. Id. at 702-3. The 
defense would allow a defendant to escape a first degree murder conviction by proving that he was not 
individually culpable for the murder. Id. However, the governor vetoed the bill, singling out the 
afirmative defense as a major stumbling block. Id. 
"' See discussion suora Da. 44-45. 
. . c  
293 See, e.g., Gardiner v. Ducharme, 187 F.3d 647 (9th Cir. 1999) (unpublished decision); 1999 
U.S. App. LEXlS 14066, at *3 (Jwe 22, 1999) (interpreting Section 9A.32.030(1)(c) of the Revised 
Code of Washington). 
294 Carnpione v. Adamar of New Jersey, 155 N.J. 245, 267 (App. Div. 1998) (analyzing the 
criminal trespass statute's affirmative defense of being in a public place in the context of lawful condi- 
tions that can be imposed upon remaining in a gambling casino); see also James L. Fennessy, New 
Jersey Law and Police Response to the Exclusion of Minority Patrons From Retail Stores Based on the 
Mere Suspicion ofShoplifring. 9 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 549, 550, 562-66 (1999) (analyzing "New 
Jersey public accommodations laws relating to our hypothetical minority customer's right to access a 
retail store"). 
295 Many jurisdictions that have adopted the defense of extreme emotional disturbance are now 
abandoning its use. Among the states that have adopted the Model Penal Code, relatively few enacted 
the Code version of voluntary manslaughter; moreover, a substantial number of the ones that did re- 
verted to the common law formulation after only a short time. See SANFORD H. KAD~SH & STEPHEN J.
SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL AW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 423 (6th ed. 1995). 
'% 18 U.S.C. $ 17 (1988). 
297 See id. 
298 Statement Of Objections To Senate Bill No. 11 19, 1999 Leg. Sess., Senate J. 802-03. 
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The absence of legislative abuse contradicts Justice Powell's prediction 
in Mullaney. The Court's past decisions, which consistently granted legis- 
latures great deference in assigning the burden of proof, did not lead to 
abuse where a f f m t i v e  defenses were concerned. 299 Instead, legislatures 
have remained remarkably restrained in their ability to exempt from full 
jury consideration elements of a crime that could mitigate a defendant's 
g~ilt.~' '  
b. The Risk of the Legislature Abusing its Power when Defining 
Sentence Enhancements 
The Apprendi Court points squarely to the concerns Justice Powell 
raised in Mullaney regarding affirmative defenses. To uphold New Jer- 
sey's statutory scheme defining "hate crimes" as sentence enhancements 
will allow legislatures to abuse the system and to eviscerate the Constitu- 
tional mandate of Winship. Over the past quarter-century, legislatures have 
easily embraced the kind of freedom about which Justices Powell and Ste- 
vens warned.302 Since the Court first coined the term in McMillan, defen- 
dants from almost all states and federal jurisdictions have waged hundreds 
of different claims, challenging the constitutionality of such provisions.303 
Legislatures at both the state and federal level have adopted sentence 
enhancements as a short-cut method to increase the likelihood of punish- 
ment for more violent or potentially threatening crimes. In their article, 
Essential Elements, Professors Nancy King and Susan Klein identify a 
significant number of instances in which state legislatures amended their 
codes to include sentence enhancements following the Court's endorse- 
ment of similar statutes in other states.304 Perhaps this legislative freedom 
is most prolific in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which Congress 
adopted in 1987.305 Kate Stith and Jose Cabranes, in their book Fear of 
299 King & Klein, supra note 24, at n.82 (finding that "[tlhe option of creating affirmative de- 
fenses 'has not lead to such abuse or such widespread redefinition of crime and reduction of the prose- 
cution's burden that a new constitutional rule was required"') (quoting Patterson, 432 U.S. at 21 I). 
300 Id. 
301 However, following Mullaney, Justice Powell's words rang somewhat true. Following Pat- 
terson, nine jurisdictions adopted the Patterson language defining extreme emotional disturbance as an 
affirmative defense to murder. See id. at 1546, Appendix A. In addition fifteen states legislatively 
adopted the Court's ruling in Leland v. Ohio that the defendant must prove insanity beyond a reason- 
able doubt. See id. (citing 343 U.S. 790 (1952)). 
302 See supra Part I (discussing recent court decisions). 
303 See, eg . ,  Underwood v. United States, 15 F.3d 16 (2nd Cir. 1993) (defendant argued that his 
sentence should be vacated because a sentencing judge, rather than a jury, found his conduct continued 
past a particular date. The court upheld the sentence.). 
304 King & Klein, supra note 24, at 1546, Appmdix A. 
305 18 U.S.C. $5 3351-59,3561-66,3571-74,3581-86; 28 U.S.C. 58 991-98. For a general dis- 
cussion of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, see STI'I'H & CABRANES, supra note 267, at 3 (stating 
that "the sentencing guidelines are rules promulgated by the sentencing commission for the regulation 
of the criminal sentences imposed by federal judges"). 
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Judging, suggest that the guidelines, which provide punishment based on 
proof of the amount of drugs one transports or the degree of violence in- 
volved in a particular crime, are really just an adjunct of the substantive 
criminal law?06 
The post- Winship increase in sentence enhancements is understandable 
given the ease with which the legislature can pass statutes and the defer- 
ence that courts pay when considering the wisdom of legislative choice. 
Crime is a bi-partisan issue and, as such, members of legislatures can easily 
join together to pass bills to ensure that those committing violent crimes 
are easily removed from the street. Once passed, the Court had, prior to 
Jones and Apprendi, adopted an almost blind-eye toward questioning the 
wisdom of removing from the jury those facts that could lead to an en- 
hanced sentence.307 The Court's great deference arguably sent a well- 
heeded signal to legislatures that sentence enhancements, as part of particu- 
lar criminal statutory schemes, are both appropriate and useful if the legis- 
lature deems them as 
The Supreme Court is likely to ignore the rally cry from strict proce- 
dualists should it revisit the constitutionality of a legislature's decision to 
assign the burden of proving affirmative defenses to a defendant. Indeed, it 
would be appropriate to do so. Under the Jones/Apprendi/Mullaney con- 
struct, the Court's reasons for retreating from broad legislative deference 
when sentence enhancements are challenged are not necessarily present 
when affirmative defenses were called into question. 
Since McMillan, when the Court first coined the phrase "sentence en- 
han~ement,"~'~ it has treated the inquiries into the constitutionality of sen- 
tence enhancements and affirmative defenses identi~ally.~'~ This is appro- 
priate given the commonality between them. Both sentence enhancements 
and affirmative defenses remove from the jury the ability to decide their 
proof beyond a reasonable d~ub t ;~"  both directly affect the amount of pun- 
306 See generally STITH & CABRANES, supra note 267, at 38-77 (discussing the invention of the 
sentencing guidelines). The guidelines provide 258 separate criteria by which judges must evaluate a 
defendant's characteristics and the characteristics of the crime, proof of any of these will increase or 
decrease punishment. Id. 
307 See discussion supra Part 11. 
The Court's deference to legislatures where crimes are concerned is not new. See Harmelin v. 
Michigan, 501 U.S. 957,988 (1991) (finding the only issue to be "whether the possible dissemination 
of drugs can be as "grave" as the possible dissemination of heavy weapons. Who are we to say no? 
The members of the Michigan Legislature, and not we, know the situation on the sbeets of Detroit.") 
309 Bibas, supra note 237, at 1103. 
3'0 See discussion suora Part I. r 
311 See discussion supra Part 111. 
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ishment that a court will assign and although the derivation of each is from 
common law, both are current creatures of the legislature. 
Although sentence enhancements and affirmative defenses share 
enough similarities that the Court has predicated its analysis of the consti- 
tutionality of one squarely on the evaluation of the other. An analysis of 
affirmative defenses under the Mullaney/Jones/Apprendi construct yields a 
result that is quite different from that of sentence enhancements. For this 
reason, it would be inappropriate for the Court to revive Mullaney. 
As stated above, in order to invalidate the legislature's ability to shift 
the burden of proving affirmative defenses the Court must find, as it did 
with sentence enhancements, that (1) the historic principles of punishment 
demand that the burden of proof remain with the prosecution; and (2) al- 
lowing the legislature to allocate the burden of proof poses the risk of per- 
mitting it to impermissibly overstep its boundaries. The results from this 
inquiry yield a different result depending on the type of "factors that bear 
solely on the extent of puni~hment,"~'~ that the Court is subjecting to con- 
stitutional scrutiny. 
A. Do the Historical Principles of Punishment Demand that the Burden of 
Proof Remain with the Prosecution? 
Historically, statutory schemes trigger due process concerns when the 
legislature decreases the rigid burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
for an element that "makes a substantial difference in punishment and 
~tigrna."~" Since Mullaney, however, the Court has never expressed any 
clear due process concerns with factors that can hlly exonerate a defendant 
or those that have the effect of extending punishment unless such punish- 
ment is extended beyond the statutory maximum for the underlying 
crime.314 As a general matter, the Court has not imposed the reach of the 
Due Process Clause beyond those factors upon which proof would increase 
the defendant's loss of 
The Court has always limited a legislatures ability to assign a lesser 
burden of proof to a factor in a criminal trial if it can "be shown that in the 
Anglo-American legal tradition, the factor in question" has historically 
made the difference between guilt or inn~cence."~ When considering the 
affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance, the Court noted that 
proof of the defense had traditionally led to a lesser punishment, not to 
complete exoneration. Therefore, the due process guarantees did not ap- 
3'2 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466,485 (2000). 
313 Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197,226 (1977). 
314 See McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79,93 (1986); Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 
523 U.S. 224,248 (1998). 
See discussion supra Part I. 
'I6 Patterson. 432 U.S. at 226. 
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ply. In contrast, Mullaney prohibited the legislature from switching the 
burden of proving a heat of passion defense to the defendant.317 It reasoned 
that the statutory scheme defining the defense absolved the prosecution of 
the requirement to prove an element that was necessary for c~nviction.~" 
The Court has only allowed the legislature to relieve the prosecution of its 
burden of disproving an affirmative defense where the defense has not led 
to a complete acquittal. 
Since the Patterson decision was limited to consideration of a partial 
defense, one could argue that under current law a legislature may not shift 
the burden of proving an affirmative defense that would fully relieve the 
defendant of culpability. However, under the Court's mandate of limiting 
due process protection to instances where shifting the burden has not his- 
torically been permitted, it seems inappropriate to extend the law back to 
Mullaney. Affirmative defenses were originally offered by the defendant 
post-conviction as a means to mitigate punishment. Eventually, mitigating 
defenses were allowed at trial, but the burden of proving them remained 
with the defendant. A defense, it was reasoned, explained the defendant's 
justification or excuse for a substantive crime. It did not go to the corpus 
of the crime for which defendant was being punished. The courts, as a 
general matter, have not historically extended due process guarantees to 
affirmative defenses. 
In contrast, sentence enhancements have traditionally been used solely 
as a means to lengthen the loss of one's liberty. Although the earliest sen- 
tence enhancements appeared in the mid-1700s, the use of elements to in- 
crease punishment, rather than to prove culpability, proliferated following 
the Court's decision in Winship. Because Winship required prosecutors to 
prove "every fact that constitutes the crime" legislators began drafting lan- 
guage that they deemed separate from the crime, despite the fact that it led 
directly to punishment. The Court sanctioned this practice in McMillan 
when it said, "the Due Process Clause did not require the prosecution to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt any element that defines the severity of 
punishment of a particular crime."319 
To date, the Court seems more concerned with limiting due process 
guarantees rather than extending them. As it stated in Patterson, "Due 
Process does not require that every conceivable step be taken, at whatever 
cost, to eliminate the possibility of convicting an innocent person."320 For 
the past eight centuries the burden for proving afirmative defenses has 
Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684,703 (1975). 
318 Id. at 702-03. 
319 McMillan. 477 U.S. at 84; see McMillan discussion, supra pp. 17-22. 
320 Patterson, 432 U.S. at 208; see Patterson discussion, supra pp. 13-17. 
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largely remained with the defendant.32' For this reason, the historical prin- 
ciples of punishment do not demand that the burden of proof remain with 
the prosecution. It is therefore unlikely that the Court would reverse the 
current trend and now require the prosecution to prove all affirmative de- 
fenses beyond a reasonable doubt. 
B .  Does Allowing the Legislature to Allocate the Burden of Disproving an 
Aflrmative Defense to the Defendant Pose a Risk of Permitting it to 
Impermissibly Overstep its Boundaries? 
Under this prong of the inquiry, the Court may not extend the Apprendi 
rule to include affirmative defenses. To be sure, the Court has repeatedly 
raised concerns that allowing the legislature great deference to decide 
which factors in a substantive crime must be proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt can lead to an erosion of the Due Process Clause.322 However, the 
slippery slope has not extended to legislative abuse of defining affirmative 
defenses. 
The current catalogue of available affirmative defenses almost com- 
pletely reflects those available at common law. In fact, many jurisdictions 
have begun a retreat from one of the more recent statutorily created de- 
fenses, that of extreme emotional disturbance.323 In contrast, legislatures 
have fully embraced their ability to define sentence enhancements as a 
means to eviscerate the due process requirements of the C~nstitution.~" 
The Apprendi Court seemed to base its decision in large part on the con- 
cern that the New Jersey legislature effectively circumvented the protec- 
tions of Winship by characterizing elements as "factors that bear solely on 
the extent of punishment."325 There is no demonstrable evidence that legis- 
latures have taken advantage of their power by reallocating the burden of 
proving a defense or defining new affirmative defenses. Therefore, allow- 
ing the legislature to continue defining affirmative defenses will pose a risk 
of permitting it to impermissibly overstep its boundaries. For this reason, 
the Court could not retreat to Mullaney under the second prong of the Mul- 
laney/Jones/Apprendi construct. 
The concerns of potential legislative abuse first raised by the Court in 
Mullaney and echoed through out the litany of cases that followed do not 
seem apparent where affirmative defenses are concerned. Ironically it was 
321 See supra Part II.A.l. The historic principles of defining affirmative defenses for the purposes 
of punishment. 
322 See Mullaney. 421 U.S. at 698 (noting that if legislatures were permitted to label elements due 
process may be circumvented); Jones, 526 U.S. at 243 (interpreting the statute in a manner in which 
"serious bodily harm" was deemed a sentence enhancement would raise serious questions under the 
Due Process Clause and the Sixth Amendment's notice and jury bial guarantees). 
323 See discussion supra notes 299-301 and accompanying text. 
324 King & Klein, supra note 24, at 1524, app. A. 
325 State v. Apprendi, 731 A.2d 485,485 (N.J. 1999). 
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in a case that called into question the legislature's ability to define affirma- 
tive defenses as "factor[s] that bear solely on punishment," which called 
the potential for abuse into question. However, the abuse that Justice Pow- 
ell warned of seemed to only extend to the legislature's use of sentencing 
factors.326 Thus, extending the Apprendi rule to affirmative defenses would 
fail under prong two of the Mullaney/Jones/Apprendi construct. 
The Court should not limit the legislature's ability to assign the burden 
of proving affirmative defenses to the defendant. In a perfect world, the 
legislature would never be able to assign the burden of proof away from 
the prosecution. Once the legislature defines a crime, the reasonable doubt 
rule should attach to every fact affecting the defendant's criminality. 
However, the Court has not allowed for such a world. To echo Justice 
Rehnquist, in Herrera v. C~llins,'~' there are limits to the Court's obliga- 
tion to ensure that innocent men do not get convicted.328 Consequently, the 
Court will only prohibit the legislature from shifting the burden of proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt away from the prosecution where the historic 
principles of punishment demand otherwise and where allowing for legisla- 
tive "manipulation" poses the risk of allowing the legislature to impermis- 
sibly overstep its boundaries. The original derivation of affirmative de- 
fenses placed the burden on the defendant to show why punishment was 
not appropriate for his particular actions. Moreover, the legislative abuse 
to which the Court responded in Jones and Apprendi seems to occur in 
instances where legislatures are defining sentence enhancements and not 
when legislating affirmative defenses. Thus, the reasons for limiting the 
legislature where sentence enhancements are concerned are not apparent 
when subjecting affirmative defenses to similar scrutiny. Therefore, under 
the Mullaney/Jones/Apprendi construct, it is unwise and even unnecessary 
to extend Apprendi to affirmative defenses. 
326 ~ ~ ~ r e n d i ,  731 A.2d at 485. 
"' 506 U.S. 390 (1993). 
328 See id. 
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